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ABSTRACT 
The Coast Guard is becoming increasingly reliant upon our nation's information 
infrastructure. As such, our ability to ensure the security of those systems is also 
increasing in import. Traditional information security measures tend to be system- 
oriented and often fail to address the human element that is critical to system success. In 
order to ensure information system security, both system and human factors requirements 
must be addressed. 
This thesis attempts to identifjr both the susceptibility of Coast Guard information 
systems to human factors-based security risks and possible means for increasing user 
awareness of those risks. This research is meant to aid the Coast Guard in continuing to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
result in lower level of overall security. 
I I '  1 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Coast Guard and our nation as a whole are becoming increasingly reliant 
upon our information infrastructure. As we do so, our capability to ensure the security of 
the involved systems increases dramatically in import. 
Traditional security measures focus on system-oriented concepts that, in theory, 
may provide safe, secure systems in and of themselves. However, systems do not operate 
in a sterile environment and human interaction is a critical component of any viable 
system. 
Malicious code, intrusion techniques, and other attacks often rely upon the human 
side of the Human Computer Interaction (HCI) chain. If mitigating security measures are 
focused solely on remedies oriented toward the system side, the problem that actually led 
to the compromise may continue to propagate. This tendency is clearly displayed in the 
spread characteristics of most modem viruses, such as the recent "I LOVE YOU" virus, 
since they rely upon a user to open and, thereby execute, a suspect file. It is'also 
demonstrated in password cracking techniques that exploit consistent procedural errors 
made by users. Updating virus definitions, establishing policy addressing password 
selection and similar measures are designed as security patches. Patchmg an exploited 
security hole, however, does not change the characteristic behavior that made the system 
susceptible. In fact, concentrating solely upon system-side solutions could in fact 
encourage lackluster compliance with recognized safe computing practices and actually 
.- . 
Security patch solutions also cause additional problems. In order for patch-based 
solutions to be effective, they must be installed and used correctly. This is not always the 
case. This leads to another human factors issue that is not limited in scope to end users. 
Network system managers often fail to install, or inadvertently overwrite the most current 
security patches during reinstallation of software. Users of all sorts fail to keep current 
virus definitions up to date. Clearly demonstrating the problem within the 
govemmentlmilitary communities, in a May 2000 meeting, members of U.S. Navy’s 
Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC) stated that the majority of identified successful 
network attacks would have been prevented had the targeted systems and users used the 
most current security patches, virus definitions, and policy instructions. In fact, the Navy 
has released information indicating that “nearly half of computer intrusions.. .could have 
been prevented had users followed two simple rules: 1. Do not click on attachments, and 
2. Use strong passwords”’[Ref. 13. The fact that systems do not have effective security 
mechanisms and are a patchwork of security retrofits that must be maintained by users 
and poorly trained administrators makes human factors crucial. 
Another consideration is the affect of information security policy upon the 
organization’s business practices. Information systems exist for the primary purpose of 
supporting an organization’s business practices. Similarly, information system policy 
should support the use information systems that enhance achievement of business goals. 
They should not prevent achievement of those goals, place excessive burdens upon users 
leading to frustration, or cause the policies themselves to be circumvented. 
This consideration becomes increasingly important as the role of information 
systems expands in today’s environment. As an organization’s information systems 
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capabilities grow and expand, security policies relating to those capabilities must change 
as well, lest restriction of goals occur. One example is shown when examining 
previously restrictive policies regarding remote access of computer systems. While 
seemingly acceptable in the early stages of the organization's development, Federal law 
now mandates implementation of telecommuting policies for federal workers thus 
making this a new-found objective for all government bodies. Policy changes that allow 
support of this new goal may be necessary. 
The questions follow: To what extent do user habits, impressions, and practices 
contribute to an organization's ability to provide a safe, secure information infrastructure; 
and to what extent do they prevent the organization from capitalizing upon information 
systems in accomplishing their business goals? To analyze that risk with respect to the 
Coast Guard, these factors need to be identified and measured. Once made, that 
measurement can be used to gauge the potential for compromise and better assess the 
focus of its efforts to provide security while simultaneously sponsoring (as opposed to 
stifling) growth through expanded use of new and emerging technologies. 
Risk qalysis based upon collected data could allow an organization to identify 
critical human factors-based weaknesses, identify sub-populations within an organization 
who might be more susceptible, and better assess the results of current security practices 
and policies. A better understanding of the human nature of the system users should 
allow the organization to better manage the HCI-based security risks. 
B. PURPOSE 
Congress has seen the need to establish specific legislation on the subject of 
Information Security. In fact, the Government Information Security Act of 1999 clearly 
identifies the need to model the government’s comprehensive information infrastructure 
upon “the ‘best practices’ of leading organizations in the area of information security.” 
[Ref. 21 Measures required by the act are established with clear knowledge of the current 
and increasing role of networked information systems within our government and 
economy. In passing the legislation, they clearly noted that the General Accounting 
Office currently lists “government-wide information security on its list of ‘high risk’ 
government programs,” and as a branch of the Department of Transportation, the U.S. 
Coast Guard is hlly subject to the criteria outlined within the act. Additional 
responsibilities and guidelines are provided for other branches including the Department 
of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Justice. 
The Government Information Security Act of 1999 provides requirements for an 
annual independent assessment of the security climate within the government and 
provides that the General Accounting Office (GAO) can accomplish this assessment. In 
September 2000 the GAO released audit results for the year 2000. They found a number 
of severe weaknesses as summarized below in Figure 1. 
As shown, the range of security weaknesses found in each branch of the 
government was significant. In December 2000, the GAO went further when it released a 
specific report focusing on the Coast Guard’s entire IT environment. The report, 
Information Technology Management, Coast Guard Practices Can Be Improved includes 
recommendations for improvements in each of five key areas among which is 
information security. Specifically, the report identifies shortcomings within the areas of 
risk assessment, information security awareness, controls, evaluation, and central 
management. [Ref. 41 
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Figure 1. Federal Agency Computer Security Weaknesses from: [Ref. 31 
The Coast Guard is rather unique within the government in that its mission 
structure is extremely diverse. Among its missions, several clearly have a heightened 
need for protection including its military, transportation, and law enforcement roles. In 
addition, the Coast Guard maintains significant stores of records containing Privacy Act 
protected information all of which must be protected from compromise. 
Sharing these roles expands the variety of e-Government programs which are 
currently in place and which are being developed. The computer user community present 
in the Coast Guard therefore becomes quite diverse as members from all communities 
interact with these systems. While the primary system used, a Windows NT based 
system bundled with Microsoft's Office '97 suite, there are a variety of other applications 
that are normally used and user training and knowledge levels vary greatly. 
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. . 
Identifylng the perceptions and practices of a diverse range of users will serve to 
assist the Coast Guard in focusing its efforts to address the concerns expressed by the 
GAO. Specifically, this study is intended to serve as: a preliminary human factors-based 
risk assessment; a gauge of users’ current perceptions with regard to information security 
awareness; and a measure of actual user practices. The objective of the study is to 
provide information that will be valuable to management in evaluating potential solutions 
to the concerns that were raised by the GAO. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
1. Methods of Assessment 
In order to satisfactorily perform this study, the current information security 
awareness environment needs to be assessed. 
assessment with advantages and disadvantages for each. 
There are a variety of methods for 
Non-obtrusive measurement, through passive observation of the user population 
performing within their normal work environment, can serve as a valuable research tool. 
Participants do not change their behavior since they are unaware that they are being 
observed. Although it has the potential to demonstrate the actual performance of 
participants, a study conducted in this manner is extremely time consuming and costly 
and there is no guarantee that all of the desired potential weaknesses will be observed 
within a given time frame. For this reason, this method is infeasible for the purposes of 
this study. However, having worked within the environment himself, the author has had 
an opportunity to make some observations with regard to normal working habits of Coast 
Guard information system users. 
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Surveys provide another means of assessment. In general, surveys can be used to 
identify general areas of concern. However, assuming that the “right” questions are 
asked, surveys can provide can provide more focused results. In this respect, the strength 
of a survey is largely dependent upon the strength of its development. Drawing upon 
other research can help to refine a survey to focus on previously identified potential 
problem areas. In addition, since, as mentioned before, the author has worked within the 
information systems environment being assessed, direct experience can aid in probing 
perceived potential problem areas. 
A disadvantage posed by surveys of computer security environments is the 
increased potential for a “fear factor” which might cause users to answer with what they 
feel is the correct answer according to policy vs. what they actually perceive as the truth. 
This often stems fiom mistrust on the part of those surveyed that their answers will be 
used against them. Within hierarchical military environment, this can prove to be even 
more critical. Failure to address this tendency in survey respondents could skew results 
and have adverse affects upon a survey’s potential to clearly and properly identify areas 
of concern. 
A third method of assessment is to assign users a specific set of tasks within a 
controlled environment and observe their attempts to work through those tasks. One of 
the studies referenced in the course of this study, Usability: A Case Study [Ref. 51 makes 
extensive use of this method. Since the area of focus of that study was relatively narrow 
in that its goal was evaluation of PGP 5.0 s o h a r e  in depth, this method worked very 
well studying that particular instance. Here our scope is much broader in that it will 
7 
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attempt an assessment of a wide range of users performing diverse tasks. For this reason, 
extensive use of task assignment method would not be feasible. 
By capitalizing on experience and other bodies of research such as Users Are Not 
the Enemy, [Ref. 61 focusing on password use deficiencies, Creating Trust, [Ref. 71 
which addresses user trust on the web, and the previously mentioned, Usability: A Case 
Study, the author feels that a viable survey can be constructed to assess the skills, 
perceptions, and practices of Coast Guard information system users. Through assurances 
to personnel regarding anonymity and the purpose of the study, as well as the fact that 
this study is being conducted independent from the Coast Guard command structure, the 
author feels that the "fear effect" can be minimized. Supplementing the survey with 
practical skills exercises and follow-on questioning of participating users will assist in 
verifymg and refining survey results. 
2. Population Selection 
Due to the diverse nature of the Coast Guard's missions, any sample population 
would have to be representative of this situation since education and skill levels have the 
potential to vary greatly within these communities. Based upon the sponsorship of the 
Coast Guard's Telecommunications and Information Systems Command (TISCOM) and 
the office of the Chief Information Officer, willing participation by four diverse units w e  
obtained. These units are as follows: 
1. The Coast Guard Human Resource Service and Information Center 
(HRSIC) focused primarily toward administrative and technology support 
functions; 
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2. The Coast Guard Marine Safety Office San Francisco Bay, which is 
focused on the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety functions including vessel 
inspection, accident investigation, marine environmental protection, 
mariner licensing, and critical incident planning; 
3. The Coast Guard Air Station San Francisco providing search and rescue 
and air support for Coast Guard operations; and 
4. The Coast Guard Station Monterey Bay, engaged in duties which include 
the search and rescue and law enforcement mission areas as well as 
providing support to the environmental protection mission and assisting 
other local and federal agencies. 
D. OUTLINE OF THESIS 
This thesis is comprised of this and three additional chapters as follows. 
Chapter II - Data Collection and Measurement Methodology: This chapter will 
focus on the methodology used in the course of this study. Specific attention will be 
given to identification of human factors concern areas, survey composition, and other 
means of assessment used in the course of the study. 
Chapter III - Presentation and Analysis of Collected Data: This chapter provides 
Comparisons are made between differing a statistical breakdown of survey results. 
groups within the sample and assessments are made against established safe computing 
practices. 
Chapter IV - Conclusion and Recommendations: Based upon conclusions drawn 
fi-om data collected in the course of this study, this chapter attempts to provide 
9 
recommendations for future security policy decisions which may enhance security while 
simultaneously allowing the Coast Guard to capitalize on expanded use of technology. 
Appendix - Human Factors Survey: Contains a copy of the survey completed by 
the participants of this study. 
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11. DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT 
METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Gauging user awareness o1 a st :ct can prove to be a ifficu t assessment. Any 
assessment must be narrow enough to be of use while at the same time broad enough to 
accurately identify, user perceptions that might affect the subject matter. The remainder 
of the this chapter will discuss the methods used in an attempt to strike a balance which 
captures user perceptions regarding specific security concerns. Upon identification of 
these areas of concern, specific methods of assessment are discussed with regard to their 
implementation in this study. 
B. IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL AREAS OF CONCERN 
When analyzing security fiom a human factors perspective, it is necessary to 
focus not only on the problem, but on reasons behind the problem. It is often necessary 
to ask why users are performing one action when they should be performing another. If 
the system, training program, policy, or some other factor creates a tendency in users 
which is contrary to the system goal, a human-factors based solution would not address 
the user’s tendency, but would focus on the item creating that tendency. 
In the case of information security, the process needs to examine all points of 
human interaction within which a failure could lead to vulnerability. Among the areas 
which should be examined are the actual practices of users which create vulnerabilities, 
user security perceptions of both the systems they are using and the policies that apply to 
those systems, user knowledge, training, and awareness levels and, the user interface. 
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1. Security Practices 
Information security practices can be examined from a number of perspectives. 
In fact, the System Administration, Networking and Security Institute (SANS) 
distinguishes between end users, senior executives, and information technology workers 
when identifylng Mistakes People Make That Lead to Security Breaches [Ref. 81. 
The vast majority of Coast Guard system users fall within the “end user” 
category. In fact, for many purposes, senior executives and information technology 
workers still operate as end users as well. In this respect, their habits are no less 
important than those of other end users. For this reason, this study will focus on the 
perceptions and practices of end users. In their list of mistakes, S A N S  identifies the top 
five security mistakes in this category as: 1. Opening e-mail attachments without 
verifylng their source and checking their content; 2. Failure to install security patches; 3. 
Installing games, and screensavers fkom unknown sources; 4. Not making and testing 
backups; and 5. Using a modem while connected through a LAN. [Ref 81 
Noticeably absent fkom the SANS listing is the mention of passwords. CISCO 
systems criticized SANS for removing password flaws from the list and, in response 
published its own listing of the Top I0 Cyber Security Tips for Security Managers and IT 
Departments [Ref. 91. In this list, Cisco places special emphasis on strong passwords and 
password change policies by placing them as the first two items on their list, justifying 
this with the fact that a significant percentage of remote break-ins are the result of bad 
passwords. Like SANS, CISCO also ranks installation of security updates and the 
tendency of users to open attachments as posing a high security risk. [Ref. 91 
12 
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The Coast Guard’s implementation of the Windows NT environment locks out the 
host computer’s “C:” drive and requires network storage. This places backup functions 
in the hands of system administrators. In addition, modems are not included in the Coast 
Guard’s deployment of its NT workstations. By eliminating these two items, the end user 
concerns expressed by CISCO and S A N S  encompass: 
1. Password implementation and use; 
2. Opening suspect e-mail attachments; 
3. Failure to Install Security Patches; and 
4. Installing software from unknown sources. 
The potential for security breaches caused by weaknesses within each of these 
categories varies based upon various factors. A further discussion of each category and 
potential for human factors weaknesses follows. 
a. Passwords 
Passwords currently serve as the primary means for system user 
authentication within the Coast Guard’s computing environment. However, use of a 
password does not, guarantee the identity of the user, and as stated above, industry 
experience has shown that the use of “bad passwords” has led to significant security 
lapses in the past. In Users Are Not the Enemy, Anne Adams and hilartina Angela Sasse 
identify several categories that lead to weaknesses in password-based authentication 
systems. Both the number of passwords the individual uses and the construction or 
content of the password itself were identified as major concern areas as were users 
13 
. . .... .. .. . . . . 
perceptions with regard to passwords, their purpose and use within the organization. 
[Ref 61 
A user’s ability to remember multiple passwords decreases as the number 
of passwords they are required to know increases. Adams and Sasse found that the 
maximum number of passwords that could be effectively managed for most users was 
about 5, and this was dependent upon the password’s use frequency as infrequent use of 
passwords reduced the users ability to remember them. 
The Coast Guard’s Information Systems Architecture relies on passwords 
beyond the initial Windows NT logon. The Marine Safety Information System (MSIS), 
Law Enforcement Information System (LEIS), and other similar networked database 
systems have additional, password-based authentication schemes. Personnel accessing 
Department of Defense resources remotely have passwords for those systems as well. In 
general, the number of password-based systems a user interacts with at work is largely 
dependent upon the individual’s occupation. 
In today’s environment, password use is not limited to systems at work. 
Users also may have passwords for systems at home. As use of the Internet grows and 
practices such as online shopping, banking, web-based e-mail, site registration, and other 
forms of secure interaction take hold, the number of passwords used outside the work 
environment grows as well. Since this has the possibility of greatly increasing the 
number of passwords a user must memorize, it becomes important to consider the number 
of passwords that a user has outside of work as well. 
The ability of a user to construct a strong password is equally important. 
Weak passwords are easily broken and therefore provide little value as a means of 
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authentication. The use of English and foreign dictionary words, keyboard strings, 
names, acronyms, and personal information such as a birth date or social security number 
all serve to create weaker passwords. 
From the user perspective, passwords have to be memorable to be of use. 
Unfortunately the techniques users create to make their password memorable are often 
the same techniques historically used by password crackers. However, since cryptic 
passwords are more difficult to remember, users often continue to create weaker, easy-to- 
remember passwords. 
Some systems, such as MSIS attempt to solve this problem by randomly 
generating passwords. However, systems such as this can cause more problems since 
users often have difficulty remembering these system-generated, “strong” passwords and, 
as a result, are forced to write them down to avoid system lock out. 
In an ideal password-system world, users would have separate, strong, 
memorable passwords for each system they are using. However, users themselves 
recognize their own memory weaknesses and attempt to compensate through a variety of 
techniques. Users may link the passwords they use on diverse systems through a 
common theme (i.e. USCG4vr.1 for system 1, USCG4vr.2 for system 2, etc ...). In the 
worst case, users may use the same password on multiple systems. In this case, a single 
password compromise would leave each of the Temaining systems vulnerable. 
To minimize the risk of possible compromise, password policies are 
usually written which require the periodic changing of passwords. Within the Coast 
Guard’s Windows NT environment, the network system manager accomplishes this by 
setting a password expiration date. At the time the old password expires, the user is 
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prompted to enter a new password. However, most policies also direct users to change 
their passwords should they feel that it has been potentially compromised. Since the 
system cannot predict the occurrence of this situation and thereby provide a prompt 
screen as it does at password expiration, users should be aware of the proper procedure 
for performing this action. Unfortunately, this information is not normally provided to 
users when they initially receive system access, and for most users, it is not a common 
practice. As such, there is a strong potential that many users would not know how to 
change their own passwords should they be compromised. If this is indeed the case, it 
would form the basis of a significant flaw in the password-based authentication scheme 
currently in place. 
6. 
The spread of malicious code through the use of e-mail has become 
pervasive. In fact, the opening of infected e-mail attachments is the most prevalent 
means of virus infection today. Since new viruses taking advantage of this are regularly 
finding their way into the wild, merely scanning for infected attachments cannot 
completely address the problem. 
Opening of Suspect E-Mail Attachments 
In order to properly attack this problem while simultaneously maintaining 
productivity, users must be able to reasonably assess the contents of an e-mail attachment 
prior to opening it. In order to do this, the user must be aware of several issues with 
regard to virus infections. 
First, the user must be able to determine the file type of the attachment. In 
the Windows environment, this is done in two ways. The Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
provides a visual key as to the application associated with the file type. For instance, a 
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Microsoft Word document attachment will have a small icon displaying the blue "W" 
associated with that program. For file types that a user is familiar with, this can quickly 
help them determine the expected application it will open with. The problem with this is 
that it is not always readily apparent to the user what application is opening the file. In 
fact, the file may, by its very nature, be self-executing. 
Windows NT uses the file extension to determine how the operating 
system will execute a particular file. For example, Windows NT will use Microsoft 
Word to open a file named Report.DOC since the .DOC extension is associated with 
Microsoft Word. By default, Windows hides this file extension for "known" file types, 
that i s  file types with an application associated with them in the Windows NT registry. 
For a user to ensure that the file type of the attachment is known, they must make the 
conscious effort to prevent the system "hiding" these file type extensions. Several viruses 
actually make use of this default setting in an attempt to lure users into believing they are 
of benign content. Viruses such as the recent HOMEPAGE.HTML.VBS may appear in a 
userk e-mail inbox without their extension. In this case, the attachment would appear to 
be titled HOMEPAGE-HTML. An unsuspecting user might open the file with the 
assumption that the file is merely a web page and not the visual basic script file which is 
easily revealed by examining the "real" file extension. 
Having determined the contents of file, the current architecture requires 
the user to know whether or not the particular file is capable of containing malicious 
code. In his article Infectable Objects, Robert Vibert provides a history of viruses and 
discussion of historical spread methods, there are "over 180 distinct file types and other 
objects which viruses could target or hide within." [Ref. 101 While many of the file types 
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are rather obscure, many are among the more common files in use by ordinary users 
today. For instance, .DOC, .XLS, and .PPT represent the file extensions for Microsoft's 
Word, Excel, and Powerpoint respectively. Each of these file types can potentially carry 
Macro viruses. Prior to making the decision as to whether or not to open a file 
attachment, the user should, at the very least, be able to recognize that the file is capabk 
of containing malicious code. 
Finally, assuming that a user has been able to determine both the file type 
and its capability to carry malicious code, there is still another decision to be made. 
Should the file be opened at all? To determine this, the user must assess the e-mail itself, 
which leads to a number of other questions: Were the correspondence and the attachment 
expected? Is the sender known, and if not, is it normal to receive e-mail from unfamiliar 
sources? Does the subject line appear legitimate? Can the origin of the e-mail itself be 
determined? The answers to each of these questions can provide critical information. 
Historically it has been shown that: viruses such as the LUVYOU can spread to all 
known users in an 0utlook.address book so that the message comes from a familiar 
person, however, the correspondence and attachment are not of an expected type; 
unfamiliar users may target a user or users with malicious attachments; viruses spreading 
through e-mail often contain subject lines which attempt to entice the user into opening 
the attachment with no real explanation of the content; and e-mail spoofing techniques 
easily allow persons with malicious intent to forge e-mail messages so that they appear to 
have been genuine. 
A user who can collect and assess that information can better determine 
whether or not to suspect a particular attachment. If all users were able to properly assess 
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incoming attachments before deciding to open them, e-mail attachment based infections 
could be expected to drop dramatically. If users proceed without the knowledge and 
awareness necessary to make these decisions while the environment remains the same, 
the likelihood is that this will remain a highly vulnerable area. 
c. 
In today’s computing environment, applications and operating systems are 
regularly released with bugs and security holes. In many cases, service packs and patches 
soon follow the software release. The problem is that these bugs and security holes are 
left in place unless the user actually acquires and installs the available patches. 
Failure to Install Security Patches 
From the point of operating system and application software in the work 
environment, this is primarily the responsibility of the Coast Guard’s IT staff. However, 
if telecommuting and remote access become more common, more of this responsibility is 
shifted to the end users since Coast Guard IT personnel would not have access to those 
remote systems. 
Even without considering remote connections, the Coast Guard must 
concern itself with the practices of end users at home if those users exchange material 
between their work and home systems. Users transferring data via floppy disk or e-mail 
increase the vulnerability of Coast Guard systems when the users fail to maintain up-to- 
date virus definitions or, for that matter, fail to have anti-virus software installed at all. 
Today, many software companies provide various “automatic” means of 
ensuring they are current. The Windows Update feature which ships with 
Windows 98Me and the Liveupdate scheduling feature included in Norton’s Antivirus 
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are examples of this type system. This would seem to remove the burden from the user 
since the software handles these functions, but this is not completely the case. 
If the user has decided to activate the critical update notification function, 
Windows Update will notify a user of a “critical update” when that user is connected to 
the Internet. However, it does not force users to download and install such updates. 
Many of these updates, especially those for the operating system and web browser, can be 
extremely large to download, especially over a slow modem connection. 
Norton’s Liveupdate also relies on the user to assist it in performing its 
“automatic” function. When setting up a schedule, Norton prompts the user to choose a 
frequency for using the Liveupdate feature. This feature communicates with the 
Symantec web site to determine if the Antivirus software itself and the virus definitions 
are current. If they need to be updated, the software will download the updates and 
install them. In order to be effective, the user must establish a frequency that ensures that 
the virus software and definitions are current. However, other steps need to be taken as 
well. If the user schedules the Liveupdate function to check for virus definitions during 
night hours, the user must ensure that the system is left on so that the action can take 
place. In addition, if the user connects to the Internet via a dial-up Internet Service 
Provider (ISP), the ISP password must be stored on the user’s system. If it is not stored; 
the Liveupdate process will halt at the user sign-on screen since the lack of a password 
will prevent Internet access from occurring. Finally, in order to ensure that the virus 
definitions are current, and to provide protection for rapidly-spreading, new viruses, the 
user should periodically manually attempt to verify the status of the updates. 
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A failure in any of the above areas can not only weaken the user’s 
personal system, but it also has the potential to pass that vulnerability on to Coast Guard 
systems through connections be they via the network or via transported disk. It is for this 
reason, that a user’s personal computing habits must become of increasing import. In 
order to assess the scope of any vulnerability here, an organization must determine 
whether or not users are managing their personal systems in a safe manner. 
d. 
On a properly configured Coast Guard Standard Workstation III, end users 
are prevented from installing software since they lack Windows NT administrator 
account privileges. If this protection were foolproof, it would appear that this would 
negate this as a security concern. However, installation prevention is not usually 100% 
effective, and, once again, user habits away from the office can affect Coast Guard 
systems here as well. 
Installing Software From Unknown Sources 
One of the largest concerns posed by the installation of software from 
unknown sources is the potential that such software might contain a Trojan Horse. 
Trojan Horse programs installed on personal systems would remain active if that system 
were remotely connected. When considered in conjunction with the password concerns 
above, Trojan Horse programs designed to capture passwords or keyboard input are 
especially dangerous since users might be using the same passwords on the Internet as 
they are for Coast Guard systems, and, in this case, any such password could be revealed 
as a result of the Trojan Horse. 
Since the Coast Guard does not control the contents of users’ personal 
systems, it is difficult to manage something of this nature. To mitigate the potential 
21 
vulnerability, users would have to be aware of the nature of such attacks and take care 
with regard to the items they installed on their personal systems. 
2. Users’ General Perceptions Regarding Systems and Policies 
In any system with human interaction, user perceptions regarding to the need and 
working of that system are critical to its success. This is no less true of security programs 
and, in fact, these perceptions can prove even more critical since the costs associated with . 
compromised systems tend to be significant. In order to minimize the risk of 
compromise, users would optimally possess a high awareness level with regard to 
security issues and would have a desire to ensure that secure practices were a high 
priority in the work place. User perceptions themselves are very hard to quantify, 
however, there can be some key indicators with regard to the general perception level. 
The actions of users and groups with respect to policy issues, the.genera1 knowledge and 
skill levels of the users, security awareness levels and the tendency of users to trust (or 
not trust) the system all form part of user perceptions, and each plays a role in system 
security. 
a. Actions of Users and Groups with Respect to Policy Issues 
In the Coast Guard, as with many military organizations, there is a rigid, 
formal environment that is intended to-provide the framework for the behavior of its 
personnel. In the area of information security, this is equally true. 
Extensive policy manuals define the expected practices of users at all 
levels. The number and size of the manuals relating to any one topic can be significant. 
Coast Guard policy covering information security can currently be found in The 
Automated Information Systems Security Manual, (COMDLNST M5500.13A), The 
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Security Awareness, Training, and Education Program Manual (COMDINST M5528. l), 
The Standard Workstation Security Handbook (COMDINST 5500.17), and among many 
others, Standard Workstation 111 Operating System Standards (COMDINST 5230.2). 
Each of these instructions provides Coast Guard-wide policy. Such instructions are often 
supplemented by Area, District, and local guidance as well. Having such a wide range of 
documents, will users know where to find guidance regarding any security concerns they 
may have? 
Publication and availability of security policy is not the only concern with 
regard to user perceptions. After an organization defines its goals with regard to its 
expectations of security, the next step is ensuring that those priorities are communicated 
to and incorporated by the system users. A user who perceives security issues as an after 
thought or who is unaware of the role security plays in the work place is less likely to 
follow secure procedures. 
If users feel that security measures hinder them in the performance of their 
duties, they may be more inclined to develop methods that circumvent secure procedures. 
Rather than seeking guidance, users may develop "work around" solutions in order to 
allow them to perform activities. Evidence of weak security perceptions can often be 
evidenced by a user's practices with regard to many of the actions addressed previously 
under security practices. In addition, if users feel that there is no real need for security in 
the transactions they engage in, they may be less likely to place great emphasis upon 
adhering to those practices. 
Such activities are not always limited to individual users either. In some 
cases, larger groups (sections, divisions, or commands) may develop procedures that 
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circumvent standard security procedures for the purpose of advancing what are often seen 
as more pressing business concerns. A clear example of this, previously experienced by 
the author, is the practice of password sharing. Groups often feel that the need to 
accomplish day-to-day business activities efficiently outweighs the need to do so in a 
secure manner. Group passwords, providing passwords to administrative personnel for 
emergency access, and password sharing are all contrary to password policies, however, 
these actions have been known to occur in order to ensure that normal business activities 
proceed unhindered. Practices such as this, where users consciously act to circumvent 
security measures, would clearly indicate security issues are not being perceived and 
practiced in the manner dictated by policy. 
b. 
Information system knowledge and skills are critical to performance in the 
General Knowledge and Skill Level of Users 
modem age. This necessity for these skills will only increase as our dependence upon 
systems continues to grow. Without the proper knowledge and skills necessary, it is not a 
reasonable expectation that the user will perform tasks correctly, and while the Coast 
Guard requires a user to go through practical and written tests prior to being trusted at the 
helm, the same user may find him or herself in command of a Standard Workstation after 
signing a document and being provided a username. While this may be the worst-case 
scenario, it is not unheard of, and all users do not approach their systems on equal 
footing. 
One key concern in this regard is the level of computer skills required to 
perform one’s duties. If a user doesn’t possess at least this basic level, they cannot be 
expected to perform the tasks necessary of them correctly or without assistance. If, 
24 
however, the individual recognizes their own lower skill level, they may be inclined to 
ask for assistance from either coworkers or system administrators. In the first case, the 
user may not receive useful assistance if the users within the group are at an equal or 
lesser skill and knowledge level. In addition, if guidance is sought fiom users who 
routinely seek "work around" solutions, this only amplifies the potential for propagation 
of such techniques. If, on the other hand, users regularly seek the guidance of the system 
administrators, users may find that those personnel can quickly become overburdened. 
Prior to 1995 the Coast Guard's Standard Workstation 11 utilized the 
BTOS and CTOS operating systems. Since there was no personal computing market for 
those systems, the service could operate fairly confidently under the assumption that 
users were gaining their knowledge and perceptions of system use while on the job. 
Since the Coast Guard has transferred to a Windows-based environment, this is no longer 
true. 
Many of the Coast Guard's users today use their personal systems as 
much, if not more than their systems at work. Perceptions and practices developed 
through home use now carry over easily into the work environment. These perceptions 
can enhance security if users develop safe practices due to their desire to protect personal 
information, foster discontent if they perceive that security policies allow them to do 
things at home that are prevented at work, and even lead to less secure situations if they 
become accustomed to engaging in insecure practices outside work since these might in 
turn carry over to the work environment. 
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c. 
Properly gauging users’ perceptions regarding the computer skill level 
they feel they possess versus the level they require to adequately perform their duties 
coupled with an assessment of the practices in which they routinely engage can provide 
valuable insight into potential areas of concern. This is especially important since users 
developing poor habits in these areas may not even be aware of the security implications 
of their actions. The threat this poses is clearly significant, and according to both Emst & 
Young’s Second Annual Global Information Security Survey [Ref. 113 and The Business 
Information Security Survey (BISS 2000) [Ref. 121, the lack of user-level security 
awareness is the largest obstacle to Information Security and proposed solutions. 
Security Awareness Level of Users 
The Automated Information Systems Security Manual, (COMDINST 
M5500.13A) [Ref. 131 defines security awareness as “a state of mind through which an 
individual is conscious of the existence of a security program and is persuaded that the 
program is relevant to his or her own behavior.” The manual recognizes that there can be 
a relationship between awareness, knowledge, and training, but it clearly distinguishes 
between them, noting that, while intimately related, it is a “conscious process.. .which 
can move an individual to specific actions.” Understanding that there is a need for 
information security awareness, the Coast Guard must determine what the awareness 
level of its users is. In attempting to raise awareness, it must also decide which measures 
will be best accepted by the user population, and which measures will prove to be the 
most effective in increasing awareness levels. 
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d. Trust in System Integrity 
In every human exchange, there is an element of trust that occurs. 
Whether money or information is exchanged, the willingness of an individual to engage 
in the transaction is governed by tendencies of trust. In this regard, people extend their 
trust to both the other party to the transaction as well as to the transaction mechanism. If 
people trust both the other party and the mechanism, the transaction can take place. 
However, if the user doesn’t trust either of these, the transaction may be placed in 
jeopardy. Likewise, if the user inappropriately trusts these elements when they should 
not, then the transaction may be compromised. 
In the information age, this plays a critical element in the expansion of e- 
Commerce and e-Government and it directly relates to the information security pillars of 
availability, confidentiality, and integrity. If users fail to trust the systems they should, 
they may be reluctant to perform transactions. In effect, failing to ensure that systems 
can be trusted results in the perception of insecurity and an unwillingness to use them; a 
de facto lack of availability. On the other hand, misplaced trust can result in the 
compromise of data which can affect both the confidentiality and integrity pillars of 
information security. 
Many computer attacks rely heavily on the ability of the attacker to gain 
the ill-placed trust of a user: malicious code spreading through e-mail is lent credence by 
appearing to come from a known sender; e-mail forgeries are designed to lead the user to 
believe the material based upon the trust they place in the apparent sender; and Internet 
transactions are conducted under the assumption that the data will only be shared 
between the sender and the receiver. 
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Examination of user practices and perceptions can help answer whether 
users can currently determine when it is appropriate to trust remote systems and users. 
Examining differences between trusted and untrusted practices can help determine what 
causes users to place their trust in a system, whether or not users are able to validate their 
perceptions regarding trust, and it can also help in assessing current and potential 
methods of conveying trust to the individual. 
3. 
Today’s Graphical User Interfaces have helped to allow computers to be used in a 
variety of tasks with an equally-diverse user base. Ideally, systems are designed to be 
“user friendly” so that performed actions are intuitive to the user and the system response 
is supposed to be equally predictable by the user. 
Interaction with the User Interface 
A number of concerns exist with respect to security and the user interface. 
Among these are: 
1. Applications are not designed with security as their primary focus. Thus, 
security is added later as a “plug-in’’ or a menu feature which is 
supplemental to the application’s primary purpose and “user fiiendliness” 
toward that primary purpose may actually aid in compromising security; 
2. Security-oriented messages and “help’’ systems often provide information 
which appears cryptic and of no use to the average user; 
3. Security features which are demonstrated through the use of icons, menu 
choices, etc ... can be easily misconstrued or left unused if users are 
untrained or unaware of their purpose; and 
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4. If systems are designed to be used in the same manner for both secure and 
non-secure transactions, even trained and aware users may become 
conditioned to one method and inadvertently use it at the inappropriate 
time. 
Failure of the interface to rectify these concerns can lead to system compromise, 
and since attackers are fully aware of these potential flaws, attacks can be designed to 
capitalize on these areas and users may operate insecurely based on their inability to gain 
access to timely, accurate, and understandable information. The extent to which interface 
issues affect security is interdependent with many of the preceding concerns including 
awareness, trust, and practices. Examination of some of the common Standard 
Workstation III interface security features can help assess users’ current ability to use 
those features and the potential for compliance with new features which may be 
considered in the future. 
Having identified these concern areas, data collection regarding user perceptions 
and practices must be collected. For the purpose of this study, the primary data source 
will be a surv,ey of a variety of Coast Guard system users. Properly constructing the 
survey toward assessing the identified areas of concern while ensuring the comfort and 
honesty of the survey participant can be difficult. The next section of this chapter 
describes the logic used in developing the survey used in the course of this study. 
C. SURVEY DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
As the primary means of assessment for this study, proper construction and 
administration of the survey are critical to obtaining usable results. The study’s 
Appendix provides a copy of the final survey used in the course of this study. 
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Throughout the following section, the rationale behind the selection of the questions is 
discussed. Details regarding the survey’s administration are included as well. 
1. Question Selection 
In order to collect statistical data, the survey begins by requesting basic 
information regarding the individual’s unit and specialty. For the purpose of tracking 
individual forms while maintaining anonymity, each form is assigned a unique form 
identification number. 
The comfort of the individual asking the questions is important, and therefore, 
questions of a technical nature, and those that appear to have a distinctly right or wrong 
answer are not presented early in this survey. Instead, questions of a general nature are 
used to acclimate the participant prior to addressing specific security issues. 
In questions 1 through 4, users are asked to evaluate the skill and knowledge level 
of themselves and their peers in relation to their assigned duties. The 1 through 7 scale 
chosen for this survey is used for familiarity’s sake since this is the same scale currently 
used for Coast Guard personnel evaluations. 
Further addressing general activities of. the user, questions 5 and 6 attempt to 
discern tendencies of users with regard to handling both routine and more difficult 
computer issues. Examples of each instance are given to aid users in determining the 
difference between “use questions” and “problems.” 
Questions 7 through 14 further begin a series of yes/no questions. Since these 
questions do not reflect directly upon activities under the user’s control, but rather on 
policy issues, they are further designed to ease the participant into the survey. In 
addition, the questions attempt to illicit whether users have access to the material 
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necessary to find answers to questions and problems on their own, and whether they feel 
that those policies are followed. 
Beginning with question 15 user-specific data is starting to be collected with 
regard to e-mail tendencies and practices. Several areas are addressed within this topic, 
including, the origination of e-mail, suspect e-mail, unofficial e-mail, and handling of 
attachments. 
Questions 23 through 28 conclude this first section of yesho questions by 
addressing specific practices, and determining whether the user has access to a computer 
system outside of the ones used at work. 
Since some of the final questions in the previous section could have made the user 
uncomfortable, another general use question is used. Question 29 seeks to gain 
information regarding the familiarity of users with various software. Knowing which 
software is used by most users in the Coast Guard can help to target security awareness 
measures to be applied in the context of those applications. For instance, if the majority 
of users limit their system use to Microsoft Word and Microsoft Outlook, increased 
awareness of viruses spread through e-mail and macros could be sought. 
For users with home systems, question 30 seeks to determine if users are 
managing operating system updates with any frequency. A failure in this area could raise 
security concerns with regard to remote access. 
The entirety of pages 5 and 6 of the survey is dedicated to user practices and 
perceptions regarding passwords and system access. For comparison with other research, 
the number of user passwords is requested, and some questions attempt to define the 
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scope of some author-witnessed practices including large groups of users sharing a single 
password and work groups requiring that passwords be filed with administrative support 
staff personnel for “emergency” access. 
Question 43 lists a number of password practices which increase the likelihood 
that a password could be easily “cracked” through malicious means. Since weak 
passwords are one of the most common and dangerous security deficiencies, knowing the 
probability that users are following weak password practices will aid in evaluating 
whether password mechanisms are currently sound and whether other techniques for user 
identification and authentication should be pursued. 
Since password compromise could have potentially detrimental effects, it is 
critical for users to understand how to change their passwords if necessary. Question 41 
is an attempt to determine whether or not users actually know how to change their 
passwords, and if the user doesn’t know how, then their perceptions regarding how to 
handle the situation of a possible password compromise are sought. 
Windows NT performs a number of tasks through the user of the “trusted path.” 
The trusted path is designed to provide an assurance to the user that, for critical actions, 
the user is actual communicating with the operating system, and not a Trojan Horse 
program. In order to invoke the trusted path on a Windows NT based system, the user 
must press the Ctrl-Alt-Delete keyboard combination. Two of the common actions that 
require this are changing the user password, and logging onto the system. Users should 
be aware that there is malicious software designed to steal passwords, and some of the 
steps necessary to mitigate that risk. Question 45 attempts to discern whether or not users 
are aware that they should attempt to invoke the trusted path prior to a log on attempt (As 
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demonstrated by the screen shot used for this question, it is not difficult to create a visual 
basic program to simulate the Windows NT logon screen. In fact, it would have proved 
more difficult to obtain a screen shot prior to a valid logon to the system). 
Since viruses pose such a significant threat, it is critical that users be able to 
identify those files which could at least potentially carry a virus. If users do not believe 
that a potentially dangerous file type can actually carry malicious code, the tendency to. 
open an infected attachment could prove more likely. 
To assist in determining the risk this poses, participants are asked to identify, 
from a list of 42 files, which, if any could potentially carry malicious code. Despite the 
fact that the default Windows setting hides the 3-letter file extension, this information is 
provided to participants to assist them in determining the whether or not the file can be 
infected. Included in the list are the many of the most common file types, the most 
frequently infected file types, and several suspicious-looking, yet benign files (including 
Chemobyl.AV1, I L W  YOU.BMP, and Trojan 1talic.TTF). 
Questions 47 through 53 present a number of “myths” to the participants via a 
series of “True or False” questions. The questions will aid in determining whether users 
are aware of how viruses spread and what differences they are likely to note with their 
systems. 
Questions 54 through 57 are designed to assess the threat of users home systems 
being susceptible to infection. The currency of virus protection software, software 
installatiodconfiguration management, and the familiarity of other users all influence the 
risk posed to users’ home systems, and by extension, Coast Guard systems if materials 
are exchanged with work, or remote connections occur. 
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Hardware security is another significant aspect of security. Most users are not 
aware of the ease with which key logging equipment can be attached to a computer 
system. If users are unaware of such techniques, and are unfamiliar with the equipment 
they should expect to have present, the potential for the successful use of such items 
increases. 
As organizations attempt to take advantage of new technologies, security features 
are developed and added to applications. How these solutions are integrated into the user 
interface and perceptions they create for users is critical to their successfbl use. One 
example stemming from the increased use of the Internet and the need to provide for 
secure transactions is the use of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) transactions for web 
browsers. 
Questions 59 through 66 are designed to address several potential issues with 
current methods of providing secure Internet transactions. Participants are presented with 
screen images of two actual Internet sites which request personal information from the 
user. The sites were selected as samples of the type of information commonly exchanged 
on the Internet today. The first is a bank that provides Internet banking options, and' the 
second is a commercial services web site that allows for Internet payment via credit card. 
One key difference, however, is the fact that the first site uses an SSL connection while 
the second site does not. 
Participants are queried regarding their perceptions of the two sites to determine 
their willingness to provide information to the sites and their reasons behind whether or 
not they trust the sites. On the following page, participants are asked directly about the 
meaning of the closed padlock indicating an SSL connection. 
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clarification of any provided comments. To solidify assurances of confidentiality, 
participants were asked to remove the cover sheets and turn them in separately and were 
assured that those sheets would be destroyed upon the completion of analysis portion of 
the study. The cover sheets have since been destroyed, and there is no means of 
identifylng any individual's response to the survey. 
Upon completing the surveys, participants were thanked for their participation 
and provided with an e-mail address to contact the author as well as the opportunity to 
discuss the survey. The length of time required to complete the survey varied fi-om 30 
minutes to 65 minutes. Most participants spent approximately 40 minutes completing the 
survey. 
D. OTHER METHODS OF ASSESSMENT 
1. Discussions With System Users 
As mentioned in the survey administration section, participants were offered the 
opportunity to openly discuss any issues they would like regarding information security 
policies and practices. Several discussions resulted in the author garnering additional 
comments and concerns regarding information security issues. In addition, the author 
also received a number of comments fi-om Coast Guard system users who were not 
survey participants. 
The author found the opportunity to interact with, interview, and discuss the 
relevant issues of this study with system users helpful in the development of the survey 
and as a source of additional information outside the scope of the survey's statistical 
results. Specific items brought to the author's attention fkom non-survey participants are 
identified as such within the results section of this study. 
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2. E-Mail-Based Practical Exercise 
Since trust and e-mail form such a critical link for so many issues on the user side 
of information security, the author developed a practical exercise to test the ability of 
participants to discern the origin of an e-mail message. The exercise was based on a 
previous project conducted by the author. 
In the previous project, the author, with the knowledge of the professor, 
constructed an e-mail message to the other 15 graduate-level students in the section, all of 
whom were pursuing degrees in information technology programs. The message was 
created using an MSN Hotmail account, but with the professor's name provided as the 
"display name." Since all e-mail addresses used were campus addresses, it was assumed 
that most, if not all, participants would receive the e-mail using the campus' default mail 
client, Microsoft Outlook. 
The message sent to the students was intended to be an obvious spoof of one of 
the many e-mail hoaxes spreading over the Internet. The e-mail read as follows: 
NPS and Microsoft have entered into a joint 
venture. In support of the Navy's decision to move to 
IT21, NPS and Microsoft have decided to offer a 
special promotion and are offering, for a limited 
time : 
-FREE GRADES- 
For complete details regarding the requirements ' 
necessary, please attend Monday's 1O:OO AM session of 
CS3030,  or you may feel free to contact me at my 
extension 656-HOAX. 
Respectful 1 y, 
[Name Used Withheld] 
CDR, USN 
Go Navy! Beat Army 
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Of the 15 students receiving the message, 3 replies were sent to the Hotmail 
account requesting further information regarding the program. Surprisingly, one student 
that replied to the e-mail and who happened to be absent for the presentation, 
subsequently approached the instructor stating, "I'm really interested in the free grades. I 
tried calling you at the extension, but I think it must be the wrong number." 
In this case, the user interface aids in lending credibility to the message by . 
showing only the "display name" in the user's e-mail in tray. If a user knows and trusts 
the individual they appear to be receiving the e-mail fiom, they are far less likely to 
check to confirm the properties of the actual e-mail address that aren't displayed until the 
e-mail is actually opened. In addition, other simple methods of e-mail forgery exist 
which allow for forging the e-mail address as well as the display name. This can even 
extend to the use of digital signatures since e-mail may be "digitally signed and verified" 
according to Outlook, but unless the user knows to click on the appropriate icon, they 
can't be sure whose signature the message was signed with. 
To test the ability of Coast Guard users to determine whether an e-mail message 
actually originated from a Coast Guard sender, volunteers were selected fiom the pool of 
survey participants. Each participant received an introductory e-mail from the author 
explaining the purpose and requirements of the practical exercise as follows: 
Subject: Computer Security Survey Participation 
First I'd like to thank each of you, once again, for your assistance in 
completing the computer security awareness survey, but I'd also like to thank you 
for volunteering to participate in the following short e-mail exercise. This 
exercise will be a practical demonstration of skills involved with using your e- 
mail interface to identify valid and suspect e-mail items. 
Shortly, you will receive 3 pieces of e-mail. Each of these will appear to 
originate from LT Shane Montoya who is currently serving at a Marine Safety 
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Office in Alaska. The subject lines of each of these e-mails will be simply "E- 
Mail A", "E-Mail B", and "E-Mail C". 
Without consulting others and upon receiving the 3 e-mails, I'd like you to 
determine which of the e-mails (if any) come from a valid Coast Guard address 
and which (if any) is not valid. If you can't determine this, that's a perfectly 
acceptable answer as well. I'd also like you to give what you feel is an honest 
impression as to which if any of the e-mails you would have suspected (had you 
not been told specifically that you might receive a suspect e-mail ... or if the person 
you received it from was familiar to you, (i.e.'boss, coworker, etc ...)) and why. 
(I've included aSAMPLE response below) Please forward your responses to 
tj whalen@nps.navy.mil. 
(The following are by no means correct ... they are merely to serve as a 
Valid - LT Montoya is a great guy. I'd recognize his e-mail 
Unknown - I can't tell. LT Montoya's e-mail doesn't ring a 
Invalid - It just looks fishy. I mean can somebody who 
sample for your responses) 
address anywhere. 
bell with me. 




I look forward to receiving your responses. If you have any questions 
regarding the survey, or its results upon completion of the analysis phase, I'd be 
happy to answer them. 
Timothy J. Whalen 
Information Technology Programs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Three e-mails were then sent to each of the participants. One of the E-mails was 
actually from LT Montoya in Alaska, and the other two were spoofed through different 
methods. In this case, the users were completely aware that they would probably be 
receiving e-mail that was not actually from a Coast Guard user. The purpose was to 
determine whether they would able to determine which of the e-mails was authentic and 
to gather their impressions as to whether or not they would have suspected and been able 
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to assess the validity of the messages if they had received them during the normal course 
of business. 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Based upon data obtained fiom industry sources and other research, coupled with 
the author’s own Coast Guard experience, a number of potential human factors-based 
information security concerns were identified. In order to assess the threat level posed by 
these concern areas, surveys and other methods of assessment were developed for the 
purpose of gauging the practices and perceptions of the user population. 
In the next chapter, a detailed assessment of the collected data should provide 
evidence of the potential threat level that exists within the scope of the identified human 
factors concerns. 
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111. PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to analyze the collected data, all survey responses were entered into 
database and spreadsheet tools. In this chapter, the resulting statistics as well as user 
comments and perceptions are discussed. 
The chapter’s initial section centers on the breakdown of the sample population 
with regard to both specialty and rank as well as the resultant handling of comparative 
results. Compiled data is then examined with regard to each of the potential areas of 
concern identified within Chapter II. 
B. SAMPLE POPULATION BREAKDOWN 
1. Analysis hy Specialty 
The sample selected for the purpose of this study was designed to obtain input 
from a variety of Coast Guard specialties. These included administrative, aviation, 
marine safety, vessel operations, and information technology specialties. Units were 
selected based upon availability, proximity, and their ability to provide personnel within 
the desired specialties. The number surveyed within each specialty is shown below in 
Figure 2. 
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Participants By Specialty 
U 
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Figure 2. Surveyed Personnel By Specialty 
Originally, the study intended to break down populations to further sub-specialties 
within the major categories, however, while 64 participants were available for the survey 
overall, the largest number available in any particular area was the 21 personnel within 
the administrative specialty. Further dividing each of the specialties would dilute results 
too much for consideration. 
Four participants reported working within more than one specialty. These 
personnel had both an operational (marine safety, aviation, or vessel operations) and an 
additional specialty that was, in all cases, listed as either administrative or information 
technology related. 
Since sample sizes were different for each of the communities, percentages were 
used in an attempt to provide comparison results. This method, while acceptable for 
noting large differences between samples, is not without problems associated with the 
smaller samples in some specialties. This becomes apparent when examining the 
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difference between those listing specialties of administrative and information technology 
related. A single unusual response in these categories would skew percentage results by 
approximately 5% and 15% respectively. For this reason, for each area of concern, the 
results of the overall sample population will be presented and larger differences will be 
noted if they appear significant. 
2. Analysis by Grade 
To ensure that a variety of experience levels and types were included, the sample 
population was also analyzed by category (i.e. officer, enlisted, or civilian) and grade to 
determine if all categories were represented. The breakdown of participants by grade is 
shown below in Figure 3. Th.e results show that the grade of the participants varied 
greatly and significant numbers of enlisted, officer, and civilian personnel all took part in 
the study. 







Figure 3. Surveyed Personnel By Grade 
Noticeably absent among the participants are personnel in the grade of 0-4 and 
above. While the lack of senior officer data and the specialty percentages do not map 
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directly to the Coast Guard’s overall population proportions, it is believed that the survey 
will still provide data which can serve to indicate user tendencies, perceptions, and 
possible areas to focus improvement efforts. 
C. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
1. Evaluation of Skills 
The 64 participants were first asked to evaluate their own computer skill levels as 
well as the skill level required to perform their duties. Participants provided this rating 
on a scale of 1 through 7. In comparing the two, 48% of the people surveyed felt that the 
skills necessary to complete their duties adequately exceeded their knowledge level. This . 
is demonstrated graphically in Figure 4, below. 
Comparison of Computer Skills to Required Skills 
50% 










Figure 4. Comparison of Computer Skills to Required Skills. 
A total of 19% of personnel felt that their abilities actually exceeded their duty 
requirements with 36% feeling that their skills met the level of their requirements. 
Statistically, participants also felt that their coworkers, on average, possessed a slightly 
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lower level of computer skills and most felt that their knowledge of computer security 
issues was less than that of their general computer knowledge. 
The disparity between the participants’ own skill level and that required to 
perform adequately demonstrates a need to increase those skill levels so that users are 
comfortable in the use of Coast Guard information systems. If users are not comfortable 
with their use of systems, or their knowledge of those systems, then the way they handle 
difficulties may prove to be unsatisfactory. 
Figures 5 and 6 show how participants would handle situations where they are 
presented with general computer questions and with computer problems. The questions 
defined these two categories differently, with examples of each being provided. 
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I 
Figure 6.  How Users Find Answers to Computer Problems 
Most users prefer to find the answer to a general question themselves and would 
seek out the assistance of a system administrator in the case of an actual problem. In 
each case, the second most popular response indicated that seeking the guidance of a 
coworker was the participant’s preferred option. While the tendency of users to attempt 
solutions on their own to seek the guidance of coworkers -helps to relieve system 
administrators, it does not necessarily guarantee that the correct procedures are followed. 
In order to proceed correctly, users faced with questions or problems would need 
. to know where to find accurate information regarding the issue. This information comes 
from application user manuals, policy, and other sources. Figure 7, which will be 
referenced again later, provides some information as to whether users feel that they can 
reasonably find such information. 
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Figure 7. Participant Responses to Questions 7 Through 28 
Just over half of all personnel felt that they knew the location of manuals for the 
software that they use. Without the ability to locate and use relevant manuals, a user's 
ability to find accurate information is limited and thus, so is the ability to adequately 
answer computer questions and problems through self-help. This is also true when users 
approach coworkers for assistance who are of a similar knowledge level. 
These tendencies did not seem to vary greatly between the various user 
specialties, and while software manuals appear to be less available, more users seem to 
feel they know the policies regarding system use, feel they know where those policies are 
located and also feel comfortable in approaching the personnel supervising those policy 
issues. While these feelings sound encouraging, much of the data that follows is 
contraindicative of strong familiarity and adherence to those policies. 
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2. Use, Selection, and Changing of Passwords and Authentication 
Practices 
Among the policy question responses shown graphically in Figure 7, 97% of the 
participants indicated that they were aware of the policy regarding authorized use. One 
of the primary methods of ensuring authorized use is through the use of authentication 
through passwords. 
Overall, the average number of passwords held by an individual was about 6.  
This number varied by specialty from a low of 3.7 per participant in the vessel operations 
field to a high of 8.4 per user in the information technology field. 
Approximately 45% of the participants indicated that the number of passwords 
they held exceeded the 5-password threshold identified in Ref. 6 ,  and 20% of those 
surveyed indicated that the number of passwords they used was greater than 10. With a 
significant proportion of personnel and the majority of the specialties carrying large 
numbers of passwords, selection of those passwords becomes even more critical to 
ensuring authentication security measures. 
Password selection, use, and policy all play key roles in the successful use of a 
password-based authentication mechanism. Questions 33 through 42 of the survey were 
designed gauge a number of these factors, and the results are shown in Figure 8, below. 
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Figure 8. Participant Responses to Questions 33 Through 42 
Well over half of all participants indicated that they sometimes have difficulty 
remembering passwords, and that has led to nearly half of them being locked out at some 
point or another for failing to supply the correct system password. 70% of the 
participants admitted that they have or do write their passwords down, however, many 
saw no problem or potential for compromise in doing so. One participant indicated that 
this was secure since the password was ". ..written down in one area no one will find," 
while another enters other passwords into a password-protected Palm Pilot. 
Further queries to the database showed higher numbers of passwords for 
personnel with access to computers outside work than the 11 personnel who stated that 
they did not have access to a computer outside of work. With outside access increasing 
the number of passwords per system user further beyond the limits of the average 
person's ability to remember them, use of similar storage methods will most likely 
increase. 
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Password sharing is also a problem. Approximately half of the personnel 
admitted to sharing their passwords and a similar proportion stated that they've been 
given another's password for access as well. In addition, 1/3 of personnel indicated that 
their units have either condoned or "looked the other way" with regard to password 
sharing practices. These actions take place and appear to be commonplace despite the 
fact that 95% of the participants indicated that they knew the Coast Guard's policy . 
regarding passwords and it lends credence to the "unmotivated user property" cited in 
Ref. 5. This states that "Security is usually a secondary goal.. .they want to send email, 
browse web pages, or download software, and they want security in place to protect them 
while they do those things." As such, if users feel that password measures provide 
roadblocks to their achieving norrnal working goals, they may feel the need to circumvent 
those measures. 
The tendency to share passwords did appear to vary somewhat by specialty. The 
numbers ranged from a low of 25% among vessel operations personnel to a high of 80% 
among marine safety personnel. From the author's personnel experience, some of the 
tendency of marine safety workers to share passwords can be limited to MSIS, ,the 
primary database system used by marine safety personnel. Password sharing is almost 
routine for many users of this system. However, even if marine safety users are excluded 
based upon the possible skewing introduced fkom MSIS (which also forces users to use 
system-generated passwords, and which is currently being replaced ), 25% - 45% of 
personnel would share their passwords, regardless of specialty, if current policies and 
perceptions remain. 
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Password sharing can facilitate compromise internally just as the construction and 
use of "weak" passwords can increase the likelihood that others could crack them. In 
order to assess Coast Guard user tendencies toward selecting weak or strong passwords, 
participants were asked to identify whether or not they used any of a number of practices 
that might weaken those passwords. On average, participants engaged in at least 3 
password-weakening practices. The percentage of users utilizing each of these practices 
is identified below in Figure 9. 







Figure 9. Password Selection Tendencies 
There seemed to be no significant differences among the various specialties in 
terms of the number of selection practices used by the groups. Some individual practices 
did tend to have higher use rates by particular groups such as English and foreign words 
being used by 73% of marine safety personnel. However, other groups such as 
administrative personnel were more likely to select names or initials that can also weaken 
passwords. The risk posed by personnel using password-weakening practices to create 
their passwords increases when taken in conjunction with other factors such as those 
previously shown in Figure 7. Since 25% of participants admitted to using the same 
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passwords on both home and work systems, this increases the potential exposure of these 
weakened passwords. 
Another means of possible compromise is through malicious attempts to capture a 
user's password as it is entered into the system. There are both software and hardware 
methods for doing this. In the case of software, Trojan horse programs designed to 
mimic logon screens as well as key logging software can be used to capture a user's 
password. Hardware solutions include special keyboards and wiring available over the 
Internet at relatively minimal costs. Whether or not Coast Guard users are susceptible to 
these attacks largely depends upon their awareness of them and whether or not they take 
the steps necessary to minimize the likelihood of their occurrence. 
Question 45 asked participants how they would handle the Windows NT logon 
screen shown, assuming it was present as they approached the machine. In this case, a 
user should invoke the system's trusted path in an attempt to ensure that the program 
asking for the user name and password is in fact Windows NT. As shown in Figure 9, 
94% of users did not feel the need invoke the system's trusted path, despite the fact that 
the key combination was listed as one of 5 possible choices. 
54 





NamelPassword i / 47% 
41 % 
Trusted Path (Ctrl. 
6% 
Al t-Del) / \ Hard Reboot 
Figure 10. Tendency of Users to Invoke the Trusted Path 
Based upon experience and conversations. with users, it appears that many users 
have developed a tendency to press the Ctrl-Alt-Del key combination out of habit when 
approaching an idle workstation even if they are not aware that they are invoking the 
trusted path. This tendency develops fiom the need to perform this action to retrieve the 
logon screen if the machine has sat idle since the screensaver will have started in a 
properly configured workstation. While this might reduce the above results to some 
degree, it does not eliminate the lack of awareness of the purpose of the trusted path 
mechanism demonstrated in Figure 10. 
The tendencies demonstrated with regard to password policy, selection, and 
practices indicates that system users do face a real threat of password compromise. For 
that reason, it is important that users understand the procedures necessary to change those 
passwords. This does not appear to be the case since only 27% of participants correctly 
knew how to change their own password in Windows NT. While an additional 35% of 
the participants stated that they would inform their system administrator, who could in 
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turn reset their password, this action would add an unnecessary delay to the process and 
might prove difficult since many users stated that they have difficulty finding a system 
administrator when they need them since they seem to have very full schedules already. 
The primary difference noted between specialties here was that two of the information 
systems workers were system managers who stated that they would change their own 
password by resetting it through NT's user manager function. While this practice would 
be relatively common for a system administrator, it is hoped that they would be able to 
inform users of the alternative, user-level means of resetting the password. 
Aside from the software-based risks, hardware-based risks provide the potential 
for malicious activity as well. Internal risks of this technology abound as users could 
easily place the items, commercially available for as little as $139 [Ref. 141, on any 
system to which they have access. Once installed, they are undetectable through regular 
system use and are operating system independent. Figure 11 shows such an item attached 
to a system and demonstrates that even a trained user might easily overlook the item 
unless specifically looking for it. 
Figure 11. Sample of Hardware-Based Key Logger Attachment from: [Ref. 141 
Internally, these could be attached to a supervisor's (or other target's) system, 
attached to an attacker's own system prior to asking a system administrator for assistance. 
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As an external threat, any person with physical access to the system could attach the item 
whether these individuals are part of the janitorial crew, industry personnel, or others. 
The only true defense against such products would be an awareness of the threat 
combined with a regular check of the connections of each system used. Figure 12 seems 
to indicate that neither of these conditions currently exists. 
I 







Figure 12. Hardware Connection Awareness and Practices 
In this case, once again, there did not appear to be any major differences between 
the various user groups. Surprisingly, even 3 of the 7 (43%) of those with information 
technology related specialties felt that such items posed little threat and that they would 
have to be installed by a system administrator. 
In general, it appears that password-use and authentication concerns present a 
strong potential threat to Coast Guard information security. Current policies are not 
strictly adhered to, users select weak passwords, and personal awareness of potential 
attack methods does not appear to be high. In addition, since the number of passwords 
per individual can probably be expected to increase as use of the Internet continues to 
grow, measures to mitigate this threat need to be examined. Plans within the military to 
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incorporate smart cards do not completely eliminate risks associated with such measures. 
Providing users with a smart card as the primary means of authentication merely 
substitutes physical security concerns for those of the password security concerns, and 
safeguarding such a card with a password or PIN reintroduces the original factors. In 
addition, designers of such programs should be fully aware that many personnel currently 
carry their bank ATM card PIN on their person. In the case of the participants of this 
study, 28% (see Figure 7) of the personnel surveyed did so, and it is reasonable to assume 
that a similar percentage would follow that practice should any smart card solution 
require the use of a password or PIN. 
Analysis of password and authentication practices shows that the Coast Guard is 
not immune to the concerns raised by industry and the cited studies, and increased 
awareness measures appear necessary. In the next section, the study considers the 
susceptibility of Coast Guard users to suspect e-mail attachments and malicious code to 
determine whether this too falls in line with the level of concern found in industry. 
3. 
E-mail has rapidly become a primary means of communication within both the 
Susceptibility to Suspect E-Mail Attachments and Malicious Code 
govemment and business communities. Fast and efficient, it makes the transfer of 
documents and data simple to the average user. Unfortunately, this same ease of use has 
also allowed malicious users to easily spread malicious code, making e-mail-spread 
viruses the most-common form of virus infection. 
Critical to a successful virus attack are several issues, including: the operating 
system used; the software used; and the user's awareness and actions. Figure 13 shows 
that the vast majority of Coast Guard system users are exposed to the Windows 
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environment and their system use includes standard office productivity applications 
including word processing, web browsing, e-mail, and spreadsheets. Coast Guard 
specific applications were also used by a majority of system users, but all other 
applications were used by less than half of the participants. While there are distinct 
differences between groups with regard to use of some of the less-used applications (such 
as FTP and other operating systems which were used by a higher percentage of personnel 
in information technology related specialties), the greatest threat for the spread of 
malicious code through the Coast Guard's NT-based infiastructure is through that 
common operating system thread combined with the high percentage of use of standard 
Microsoft Office applications. 
Applications and Software Used by Participants 
I 
Figure 13. Applications and Software Used By Participants 
With those points in common among nearly all system users (variation among' 
applications occurred predominantly in the lesser-used applications), user awareness and 
practices become the greatest single threat for allowing the continued propagation of 
malicious code through e-mail and other delivery methods. 
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For that reason, user perceptions and capabilities are critical to minimizing the 
potential for these attacks. In the current use environment and in order to prevent a 
successful attack, users must be reasonably trusted to perform certain actions including 
properly determining the origin of e-mail, determining whether they trust the source of 
the message, and identifying objects which potentially carry malicious code. The 
problem is that most users don't appear to have these skills. Figure 14 provides 
information regarding the surveyed participants' ability to identify some of the more 
common files that are used to carry malicious code. 
Percentage of User Identifying Potential Virus Types 
A!i% I 
I 
Figure 14. Percentage of Participants Identifylng Potential Malicious Code Carriers 
Despite the fact that most participants stated that they use Microsoft Office 
products and that the Coast Guard has issued gkdance regarding macro viruses for these 
applications, the majority of users failed to recognize that these files could carry 
malicious code. In addition, 70% users failed to recognize Visual Basic Script (VBS) 
files as potentially harmful. 
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The percentage figures indicated by Figure 14 could even be perceived as being 
artificially high. This is because the 9% of users who circled the entire list of files are 
included in this breakdown. In addition, the percentage of users capable of identifjing 
potentially harmful file types, once again, was not significantly impacted by the 
participant's specialty. In fact, aside fi-om those selecting all possible file types, only one 
participant correctly selected VBS, COM, EXE, BAT, and ZIP files as being potentially 
harmful, and even this user failed to identifjr the threat posed by Office macro viruses. 
While proceeding with the assumption that all files are potential carriers can lead 
to a safer environment, it may also prevent users from accessing valuable information. 
The author has personal experience with how this can prove to be extremely 
inconvenient. Installing Microsoft's Outlook Security patch prevents [Ref. 151 users fi-om 
opening certain e-mail attachments including VBS, COM, EXE, BAT, and MDB files 
from those listed in Figure 14. By over-filtering and preventing users from exercising 
any judgment regarding the file attachments, the security update excludes large numbers 
of legitimate files as well. In the author's case, this prevented the exchange of EXE and 
Access database files that were both safe and needed to accomplish work. The use of the 
security update prevented the exchange of these files via the author's normal e-mail 
account. 
When users apply blanket solutions, such as mistrusting all attachments out of 
fear or misunderstanding, they limit their own capabilities to fully capitalize on the 
systems they are using. When organizations react in this manner, they limit the 
capabilities of all users. Such solutions need to be carefully considered before they are 
applied to prevent user fi-ustration and expanded use of user workarounds. 
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Other user perceptions with regard to viruses also play key roles in the ability of 
malicious code to spread. To determine whether system users knew the difference 
between malicious code facts and some common misperceptions, participants were asked 
a series of 7 true or false questions. User perceptions regarding these issues are 









Perceptions Regarding Behavior of Malicious Code 
Figure 15. 
Only 25% the participants correctly answered all questions as false, and no 
particular specialty, including those of the information technology related specialties, 
User Perceptions Regarding the Behavior of Malicious Code 
seemed to be able to have significantly better perceptions in this area. 
Several of the questions seem to indicate that a significant number of users feel a 
false sense of security in that they feel the Coast Guard’s firewall has capabilities that are 
unavailable, that malicious code infection is always obvious, and that limiting use to 
Microsofi Office products decreases the risk of infection. Increasing awareness of these 
and similar issues is critical if security decisions continue to fall into the hands of end 
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users. Since, as mentioned above, removing these decisions often leads to unacceptable 
restraints, the need for this increase is heightened. 
Further problems are evidenced when users perceive that they are engaging in a 
secure action but are, in fact, compromising security. A clear example of this would be a 
user's tendency to determine the validity of a suspect, e-mail message. 
The brief e-mail exercise conducted as part of this study demonstrates that users 
cannot successfully complete actions they feel they know how to perform. Seven of the 
10 participants who volunteered for and responded to the exercise, were unable to 
correctly determine whether each of the 3 e-mail messages actually came from a Coast 
Guard e-mail account. This occurred despite the fact that 84% of all participants stated 
that they felt that they could identify suspicious e-mail. (Direct correlation to the 
responding participants was not possible due to the anonymity measures taken. At the 
time responses were received, the cover sheets had already been destroyed.) 
The results of the e-mail exercise are not necessarily surprising when compared to 
the results of the initial e-mail mentioned at the end of Chapter II. The Microsoft 
Outlook user interface actually assists in misleading users to trust fraudulent e-mail based 
upon its use of the "display name" in the-user's In Tray. Figure 16 demonstrates that each 
of the 3 e-mails, appearing within the In Tray, seem to have been sent by LT Shane 
Montoya. 
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Figure 16. Graphical Display of Outlook In Tray 
From the In Tray display alone, none of the e-mail messages appears suspicious. 
Figure 7 shows that most users open and read all e-mail they receive. Figure 17 shows 
that merely opening "E-Mail A" provides an indication that the e-mail is not from a Coast 
Guard user since the true originating e-mail address is displayed after the arbitrary 
display name. For this reason, 8 of the 10 participants were able to correctly identi@ e- 
mail "A" as suspect. 
&you have ajob wzthout aggmvations, you don't have a job 
I - Malcom Forbes 
Figure 17. Hotmail Account Spoof of Display Name Only 
The task became more difficult when users were asked to make determinations 
with regard to e-mails "B" (authentic) and "C" (forged). In order to make an assessment 
64 
~ 
of this e-mail, users had to be able to display the message's extended headers. 
Performing this action tends to be different for most e-mail client software packages and 
has even changed between the most recent versions of Outlook (98 and 2000). In 
addition, users would have to be able to actually interpret the information contained in 
those headers. Most participants were unable to do so. The user interface did not make 
these tasks easy. In fact, some people mistrusted the valid e-mail instead of the forged e- 
mail based upon information they did find provided to the by the user interface. In one 
case this was because the participant had brought up the properties feature associated 
with the e-mail address. Doing so, the participant found the e-mail address as 
Smontoya@cgalaska.uscg.mil. While this address is valid, it did not meet the 
participant's expectations since Alaskan units do not follow the @dXX.uscg.mil naming 
convention (where XX is the district number) established for most of the Coast Guard e- 
mail addresses. 
The study also considered another area that is important to the prevention of virus 
infections. Properly installed and maintained, virus protection software can greatly assist 
in reducing the risks posed by virus infections. However, virus protection software 
which does not include recent virus definitions can prove worthless in these days of 
rapidly-spreading, new viruses. Figure 18 shows how participants responded with 













Figure 18. Virus Protection Update Practices 
While 88% of those with outside computer access indicated that they had virus 
protection software installed, 60% of those same users updated that software monthly or 
less frequently, with 30 days being the maximum length of time between updates 
recommended by most virus protection software vendors. In addition, of the users stating 
that their software was set to manually update, none of those responding appeared to have 
taken all the necessary measures to ensure that connections could proceed completely 
automatically as discussed in Chapter II. 
The failure of users to maintain virus definitions in an up-to-date manner could 
prove harmful to Coast Guard systems both with the expected increase in remote access 
and when considered with the Figure 7’s data which shows that half of all the participants 
currently exchange material between work and their outside systems. 
Actions on home systems may continue to pose increased threats with the 
expansion of remote access since software installation, operating system updates, and 
other similar actions are not subject to more stringent control measures as they are at 
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within the workplace. The next section will address potential areas of concern with 
regard to such practices outside the workplace. 
4. Software Maintenance and Installation From Unknown Sources 
When remote connections are allowed to outside systems, the Coast Guard’s 
network security drops to the level of that system. Just as with virus protection software, 
the Coast Guard must rely on end users to ensure that appropriate software security 
patches are in place and that the s o h a r e  installed on those systems is trustworthy. 
However, as Figure 19 demonstrates, the participants themselves did not completely 
control the systems used outside of work with over half reporting that multiple people 
regularly install software on those non-work systems. This tendency will most probably 
become more prevalent as multiple-computer families, broadband access, and home 
networks continue to gain in popularity. Still, the installation of software by multiple 
people doesn’t necessarily indicate that such software is from untrustworthy sources. 
However, 28% of the participants stated that it was normal for persons less familiar with 
computers than themselves to regularly install software. Since previous data presented 
has demonstrated that the surveyed users could find themselves susceptible to 
inadvertently executing malicious code through misplaced trust, it can be assumed that 
those less familiar users might be just as likely to perform those actions. 
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Software Installation 








Figure 19. Software Installation and Computer Familiarity 
With the exception of those working within information technology related 
specialties, there was very little difference between specialties with regard to the 
installation of software. In the case of the infomation technology workers, the only 
significant difference noted was that 100% of the personnel felt that the other users of 
their outside systems were less familiar with the systems than they were. This would be 
consistent with the fact that these personnel work professionally within that field. 
However, an important note is that information systems workers were just as likely as 
other groups to have others, all of whom were less familiar, installing software on their 
systems. 
In addition to concerns regarding the applications installed on end-user systems, 
the updates to the operating system itself plays a key role in system security. Microsoft 
seems to routinely issue software security patches for its operating systems. The same is 
true for many Windows-based applications as well. Unfortunately, as Figure 20 shows, 
the vast majority of users fail to regularly check for and install updates, despite the fact 
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that most users utilize Windows-based operating systems that incorporate semi-automatic 
update features through “Windows Update.” 
Frequency of Operating System Updates at 
Home 
Figure 20. Frequency of Operating System Updates at Home 
While users may feel secure in using their home systems and networks when they 
have failed to install recent updates, the Coast Guard needs to consider such trends when 
weighing the costs and benefits of remote access expansion. 
While expansion of remote network connections could provide increased 
exposure to viral and update installation issues, the increased use of the Internet generates 
additional concerns as well. In the next section, the study’s analysis examines users 
perceptions with regard to their use of secure Internet connections and the implications it 
might have on the increased use of such technologies. 
5. 
Currently, the primary means of providing secure transactions over the Internet is 
through the use of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) connections. This technology is currently 
Secure Socket Layer Transactions and Internet Trust 
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used by banking, commercial enterprise, and government sites to provide a secure 
connection between a system and remote user through the use of digital certificates. 
Without such measures, transactions over the Internet would be subject to packet 
sniffing and other attacks which could compromise the data during transmission. For this 
reason, it is important that if users don’t have an understanding of how the technology 
works, that they at least have an awareness of the indications that a secure connection is 
in fact in place. It is also important that users feel that they can trust the security of those 
transactions and that they be able to assess messages returned by the system. Figure 21 
provides information regarding the participant’s perceptions regarding two web sites 
presented to them as part of the survey. 
User Tendencies Regarding Internet Transactions 
Figure 2 1. User Tendencies Regarding Internet Transactions 
Site “A” was a major commercial banking institution that uses SSL to ensure the 
security of its transactions. Site “B” was a purebred dog registration site that requested 
credit card payment over the Internet for its registration services. This site does not use 
an SSL connection to protect this information. 
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While only about half of all personnel felt safe and comfortable conducting 
transactions on the Internet, it appeared, at first, that those who did recognized the 
security provided them by the SSL connection. The follow on question, however, 
indicated otherwise. User comments indicated that most users did not know about or 
understand the security measures used by Site “A.” Instead, users tended to trust the site 
for a number of collateral reasons including the fact that it appeared to be more 
professionally presented, that they recognized the bank and its reputation, and that they 
may have accessed their own bank accounts through similar sites. On the other hand, 
participant reluctance to use site “B” was largely due to similar reasons including poor 
color schemes. In most cases, participants were more reluctant to provide credit card 
numbers than to merely access account information, but the opposite was true as well, 
with one user noting that credit card “. ..liability is limited to $35.00,” while exposing 
bank account information could lead to a much greater loss. 
On the following page, users were specifically asked the purpose of the SSL- 
indicating padlock icon displayed on site “A.” When specifically asked about this, 63% 
of the participants understood that this was supposed to provide them with some 
indication that the site had a secure connection. This understanding did not vary greatly 
across the various specialties with information systems workers obtaining the highest rate 
of 71%. However, user comments, combined with the lower feelings of trust and safety 
indicate that what they are told is secure does not necessarily inspire trust. 
User comments regarding the follow-on screen images also communicated 
discouragement among the participants. Many felt that the warnings, notices, and “help” 
screens were cryptic and confusing. A common answer for many participants was “?” 
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indicating that participants had no idea what they were being told. Furthermore, when 
users didn’t understand what they were being told, their tendency to trust the site and 
willingness to perform transactions there dropped significantly. 
This, combined with the data shown in the e-mail exercise clearly demonstrates 
that the user interface is critical to the formation of user perceptions, whether positive or 
negative, that influence user trust. These user expectations and assumptions can greatly . 
impact security programs and are critical to successfully providing secure computing 
services in the future. 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the study analyzed the data obtained in the survey and identified 
several potential security threats to the Coast Guard’s information infrastructure. As the 
organization and the government as a whole proceed to further develop information 
technologies, secure transactions will continue to increase in frequency of use and import. 
In order to ensure that users securely interact with those systems, the Coast Guard 
will need to take steps to increase user awareness and develop systems that the users can 
be reasonably expected to properly and securely use, but what are the right steps to take 
toward this goal? The next chapter will attempt to analyze some possible alternatives and 
make recommendations to assist in maintaining both information technology growth and 
a secure computing environment. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF DATA ANALYSIS 
Based upon the findings reported in Chapter 11, it is apparent that human-factors- 
based security concerns present in the industry and identified in other bodies of research 
are equally prevalent within the United States Coast Guard. System user weaknesses 
were identified in each of the evaluated potential areas of concern, and reduction of these 
tendencies does not appear to relate directly to the experience level of the user. If it did, 
those users in the information technology field would have been expected to fare 
dramatically better, but this was not the case. While that user group did demonstrate 
differing ability levels in some areas, they were by no means immune to many of the 
common practices and perceptions that formed the weaknesses identified in the general 
sample population. 
Since information technology personnel seemed to share many of the same 
weaknesses as the general population, it appears that experience alone does not 
necessarily eliminate security concerns. So, what measures can the Coast Guard take to 
reduce the occurrence of insecure practices? In the next section, the study will discuss 
possible alternatives that could be implemented to reduce the level of concern. 
B. PRACTICE IMPROVEMENT MEASURES 
1. User Authentication 
Since the data collected in this study supports the conclusions reached by Adams 
and Sasse [Ref. 61 and demonstrates that many of their concerns are common among 
Coast Guard users, a number of their recommendations could also prove valuable in 
mitigating the potential security concerns for the Coast Guard. Among the 
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recommendations that might prove useful are the utilization of smart cards, biometrics, 
and a single sign on, in addition to increased user awareness. Each of these 
recommendations has the potential to assist in alleviating some of the concerns identified 
in the course of this study and they are discussed individually, below. 
CI, Smart Cards 
Smart cards provide strong potential for reducing the number of passwords 
used by system users at work. In doing so, as mentioned in Chapter lII, they substitute 
physical security concerns for the password concerns they would be used to replace. 
That being the case, implementation of any such program would rest heavily on the 
ability of users to secure their smart cards and loss rates would probably be similar to 
those currently found for identification cards. 
In the case of a military identification card, the individual’s photograph 
and signature on the card provide an additional level of security to prevent unauthorized 
use. In the case of a smart card, additional security could be attained through the use of a 
password or PIN, but also as stated in Chapter 111, a significant number of users currently 
carry PIN’S on their person with their bankcards. Without strong awareness, a similar 
number of users might be inclined to carry smart card PIN’S as well. 
Whether or not users are comfortable using such technology is an 
additional hurdle for program implementation. Survey results indicated that only 45% of 
personnel felt comfortable with using smart cards, however, through comments several of 
the participants indicated that they would probably feel comfortable if they were trained 
in their proper use. 
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b. Biometric Devices 
Biometric devices provide an additional means of secure authentication 
that removes the normal physical security concerns of loss and theft one faces with the 
use of smart cards. Finger print scanners, optical scanners, and similar devices establish 
a user’s identity that can be used for access. 
Due to the physical nature of these devices, some users feel less * 
comfortable using them, however, the survey showed that 55% of the participants were 
willing to utilize these devices vs. the 45% who were willing to use smart cards. Further 
examination showed that those working in information technology related fields, since all 
7 of these individuals felt comfortable using such devices, somewhat skewed these 
results. However, once again, personnel indicated a willingness to use such technology 
with training in its proper use. 
c. Singlesign On 
Both smart cards and biornetrics have significant disadvantage to users in 
that additional hardware is required to support such devices. The cost and availability of 
these hardware components might prevent users fkom being able to use these 
technologies and simultaneously take advantage of opportunities for telecommuting and 
expanded use of remote access. Without the use of additional hardware, single sign on 
can be used to relieve many authentication concerns while still allowing users the 
flexibility of remote access and without a significant hardware investment. 
Single sign on eliminates the need for multiple passwords on work 
systems. With the system set to allow predetermined access levels to each application 
used, users are able to complete their duties and they are not forced into developing 
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elaborate means to store or remember an increasing list of passwords. However, such a 
solution may introduce a management burden a may not be flexible because of that. 
While single sign on might alleviate some problems, it would not 
eliminate them. Development efforts undertaken in this direction would have to take into 
consideration the need of users to access non-Coast Guard systems such as those within 
the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to determine whether access to 
those systems could be supported as well. In addition, the tendency of users to select the 
same passwords at home and at work remains a concern and, in fact, the risk posed by a 
single breach would be greater since access to all systems would then rely upon a single 
point of failure. 
d Increased User Awareness 
A common element of each of the previous, potential methods of 
improvement is increased user awareness. Whether the Coast Guard continues to use its 
current system or attempts to implement any of the three previous technologies, 
competent and willing participation by users is critical to successful efforts to provide 
system security. Finally, when dealing with hardware-based key logging attacks, user 
awareness and actions appear to be the only current way available to identify and handle 
these threats. 
Perfectly outlined security policies and procedures are of little benefit if 
users and organizations are unaware of their requirements or do not follow them, just as 
users cannot be expected to create strong passwords or change those passwords if they 
are unaware of how to do so. 
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2. 
Most recent virus outbreaks have propagated the use of e-mail attachments. In 
order to prevent the spread of such viruses, the ability of users to properly use their e- 
mail client software is critical. However, as this study’s data has shown, most users do 
not have the knowledge required to make informed decisions about the attachments they 
receive. 
E-Mail Security and Execution of Malicious Code 
There are a variety of aspects of e-mail management currently left to the user: 
including trust of the e-mail source, identification of the appropriate file type, and the 
decision regarding opening of that attachment. Without ensuring that users can perform 
these actions in a knowledgeable manner, the Coast Guard leaves itself susceptible to 
malicious code infection through e-mail. 
Addressing the first concern, users cannot be relied upon to trust the source of a 
given e-mail. In order to ensure that identity of an e-mail sender, the use of Public Key 
Encryption systems that allow for both digital signatures and encryption exist. 
Unfortunately, current methods of securing e-mail do not necessarily provide great relief 
for users. Whitten and Tygar [Ref. 51 found that a significant number of users were 
unable to successhlly use a common e-mail encryption tool despite the fact that subjects 
had access to the manual for the software used. Some software packages that allow for 
signing and encryption act as plug-in features within current e-mail client software. In 
the case of Microsoft Outlook, the Coast Guard’s standard e-mail application, these 
features usually work as button-based icons similar to those used for file attachments. 
Based upon their own experiences, 53% of the study’s participants felt that they would 
inadvertently forget to sign e-mail if the application was configured to require explicit 
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user action for signing. Likewise, 53% felt that merely setting encryption and signatures 
as the system’s default setting would not be acceptable if it made their e-mail unreadable 
or unusable by some outside recipients. 
Assuming that users do trust the source of the e-mail, the contents of any 
attachments are also subject to scrutiny due to the nature of many of today’s viruses such 
as the I L W O U  and Melissa viruses. Since, as mentioned in Chapter III, filtering all 
potentially harmful attachments may not be a viable solution, users are left with the 
responsibility of determining whether they should trust these on their own. The data 
presented in this survey demonstrates that at this time, most users are not prepared to do 
so. Failing to educate users regarding methods for making these determinations will 
result in continued virus infections and some users over-filtering attachments out of fear. 
Both of these results have an adverse impact on business practices and point to the need 
for better education in this area. 
For remote connections and for data exchanged from users’ homes, the Coast 
Guard must also rely upon its personnel to maintain up-to-date security patches, 
including virus definitions. Since the Coast Guard does not control users’ systems 
outside of work, awareness once again becomes critical. If users are unaware of patches, 
virus definition updates, and installation procedures, they will be unlikely to use them. 
Some businesses and government organizations have even purchased extended licenses 
for virus software to cover users home systems. Even though these programs allow for 
the free use of the software by the individuals, the systems still rely upon those users 
actually installing and periodically updating the software, and they may be unwilling to 
do so if they fail to perceive a threat to their own or the Coast Guard’s systems. 
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3. Interface Issues 
As demonstrated in both the e-mail exercise and the SSL questions of the survey, 
the current Windows user interface does not provide most users with the information they 
need to make informed security decisions. Instead, cryptic security warnings tend to 
further confuse users with most failing to understand their meaning. Left with the choice 
of trusting a system they don't understand or not using that system, most users seem to err 
toward the latter choice. Refusing to use new systems is not an option that will allow the 
Coast Guard to capitalize on technology. 
Ideally, new interfaces would be developed that incorporate easily understood 
security features within their design. This does not appear to be the case for the near 
future, and as new applications are developed, so to will new security concerns arise. 
Instead of relying upon plug-in solutions, users should be made aware of the 
security implications of the applications they use. Whether e-mail, a web browser, or a 
Coast Guard database application, each has unique security features and concerns 
associated with it. Allowing users to blindly use these applications without introducing 
them to these features only heightens the risk they pose, whereas indoctrinating them into 
the proper 'use of all of the applications they use fosters proper use as the rule vs. the 
exception. 
C. INCREASING USER AWARENESS 
While there are a number of measures that can be taken to address specific 
security Concerns and practices, each of those solutions requires proper participation by 
the user in order to be implemented effectively. Smart cards require users to take 
physical security precautions, virus definitions must be updated, and trust relationships 
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must be formed. Regardless of the technology used, as long as there is a human element 
involved in the transaction, user awareness will play a key role in ensuring those systems 
remain secure. This only reinforces the emphasis that companies have placed on user 
awareness as a hindrance to their ability to implement security solutions [Ref 11 & 121. 
There are numerous ways to 'attempt to increase the security awareness level 
within an organization. In the military, many of the attempts to raise security awareness 
stem from military intelligence concerns as demonstrated by the Security Awareness 
Training and Education (SATE) program. The SATE program was established to help 
people "recognize, understand and accept the need to protect government assets," and it 
specifically identifies this need with respect to classified information, property, and 
personnel. In addition, Coast Guard members are exposed to a variety of other 
awareness programs such those for medical mishaps, crime prevention, and boating 
safety. Key to each of these programs is that they are designed to bring about a vigilant 
attitude in users so that knowledge of the program's subject matter is always consciously 
available. 
Identikng the methods best suited for the Coast Guard in increasing user 
awareness entails a combination of many factors including the program cost, the 
willingness of users to participate, and the actual effectiveness of the program with regard 
to increasing awareness. Table 1 provides details regarding user perceptions, perceived 
effectiveness, and the estimated cost (in time and funding) of implementing 10 program 












5-1 0% Coworker Training 
ESO Training Videos 
FAQ Website 
Awareness Posters 
Program Relative Cost of 
Effectiveness Implementation 
1 High 






9 Low to Moderate 
5 Low 
10 I 10 I Low I 
Instant Message Help 
Sys Admin Password Cracking 
Live Hack Demos 
6 3 Low to Moderate 
9 8 Low to Moderate 
7 4 Moderate 
responses for each of the identified programs while relative cost information is an 
estimation of the cost of implementing any awareness program on a Coast Guard-wide 
basis. The ranking scale ranges between 1, the most effective program, to 10, the least 
effective. 
From the table, participants perceived the most desired and effective program to 
be one using required formal training. However, any such program would also be 
extremely expensive to implement for all users in the traditional sense of classroom- 
based training. 
Alternatively, advanced training for 510% of workers could prove to be 
extremely beneficial to the Coast Guard. Participants perceived this option as second 
highest in both effectiveness and in their willingness to see it implemented. In addition, 
since a significant proportion of the participants stated that they seek coworker guidance 
for their questions and problems, this advanced training could assist ensuring that users 
receive proper guidance in these situations. 
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One potential disadvantage of this method would be an increase in the 
“technology divide” perceived by a number of users. Several users made comments on 
their surveys and verbally regarding double standards among users since IT personnel 
were able to install software, access features, and perform services fiom which “normal” 
users were restricted. As one user stated, “All aren’t treated fairly. We’re told not to do 
something regarding the computer, but others ‘in computers’ are allowed to.” This 
perception also led to lower levels of trust by users since some members didn’t trust their 
administrators since, “all files can be viewed locally by TC’s. (You can’t store anything 
that) you don’t want others to see.” 
Properly implemented, training office coworkers could assist in easing instead of 
aggravating these feelings. Since members of their own work group could be granted 
increased system access privileges based upon their level of knowledge and training, the 
perceived divide between IT workers and the average workers would be seen as less 
extreme. 
The third most desired program was that of periodic online testing. Depending 
upon its implementation, this can provide a quick, objective means of assessing user 
knowledge regarding key security concepts. The Naval Postgraduate School has used 
such a program to ensure that users understand various system use policies. Constructed 
with links to reference material, and capitalizing on online education techniques, systems 
such as this can validate knowledge the user has and reinforce understanding of apparent 
weaknesses. 
s 
Many users currently feel the effectiveness of such programs offers little promise, 
and with regard to effectiveness, they ranked this program as the 7* of the 10 possible 
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solutions they were given. However, the fact that it was ranked as third with regard to 
user willingness to participate seems to bode well for the Coast Guard’s recently 
introduced program which allows users access to online education courses. If significant 
numbers of personnel take advantage of these opportunities and have favorable 
experiences in doing so, perceptions regarding program effectiveness could improve. 
Participants felt that the third and fourth most effective programs would be the 
use of a security “Answer Man’, and the use of hacking technique demonstrations. 
However, even though they felt these measures would prove to be effective, their 
willingness to participate in such programs was below average. Some of this appears to 
be due to lack of familiarity with the systems, and in the case of the hacking 
demonstrations, a feeling that it could lead to more harm than good. 
Corporations, such as American Airlines (http://www.aafltsvc.com/fsoperations) 
have used instant messaging with some success to answer questions from remotely 
located employees. Allowing users to receive just-in-time answers to their questions 
fiom a live person can assist in building user trust in the systems, and the interactive 
nature achieves this much more effectively than e-mail which can be subject to undue 
delays and often provides no indication that it has either been read or even received 
[Ref.16]. Assuming that staff members could maintain active participation in such a 
program, whether using instant messaging or online chat format, the potential to provide 
users With policy-based answers to questions and concerns appears promising. However, 
due to the lack of familiarity and trust of many users in such programs, initial experiences 
would prove critical to building user trust in the system. If the system fails to meet user 
expectations, the likelihood that they would use such a program would decrease. 
83 
Since hacking demonstrations also face user reluctance, care should be taken in 
implementing programs of this nature as well. One possible solution would be to 
combine this solution with that of the advanced training of 5-10% of personnel. From the 
author’s personal experience, practical demonstrations have proven critical toward 
demonstrating just how easily systems can be compromised and how much the systems 
depend upon users awareness. Exposing selected members to these techniques would 
provide greater exposure of the user population to existing potential threats, and these 
users could in turn assist in increasing the awareness level of other users within their 
work environment. 
Many of the lower cost solutions are perceived by users to be of little or no value. 
Among these were the use of awareness posters and Educational Service Officer (ESO) 
training videos. Discussions with personnel indicated that these measures would fail to 
draw their attention and go unused respectively. Based upon the user apathy toward 
these solutions, and unless there are clear indications to the contrary, it appears that any 
awareness funding would be better spent on other efforts. 
Users themselves recognize that they’re security awareness is important to their 
jobs, with 67% of personnel surveyed feeling that they could perform their duties more 
safely and effectively if they’re awareness level was higher. Taking advantage of the 
techniques described above, positive steps toward increased user awareness should be 
possible. 
Assuming that user awareness can be heightened, other perceptions can also 
influence the success of a security program. If users are fully aware of concerns, but feel 
that their business practices are not being supported, this can easily lead to user 
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. . . 
hstration. The next section of this chapter will discuss user perceptions regarding the 
Coast Guard’s security program and use of technology. 
D. GENERAI, USER PERCEPTIONS 
When asked about the Coast Guard’s security program, 64% of users felt that 
current security measures were neither too weak nor too strict, however, only 62% of 
users felt the Coast Guard was taking full advantage of current technology. When 
queried further, many of the comments provided by users indicated areas where security 
concerns seem to be hindering factor in the use of technology. The two chief areas of 
concern expressed by users were remote access restrictions and software installation 
barriers. 
1. Remote Access Restrictions 
There were a variety of users who felt their performance was hindered by their 
inability to remotely access files, e-mail, and other applications. Many personnel 
working in congested areas cited desires to telecommute, or at least access files and e- 
mail after hours. Others cited direct, operational needs to remotely access systems 
including the ability to send photographs and information from accident sites, accessing 
Coast Guard databases when conducting remote inspections, and the lost work product 
resulting fkom discontinuity in service when traveling. 
Increasing numbers of users are discovering the potential for remote access to 
enhance their operational abilities. These enhancements are further complimented by the 
positive impact that they can have on workers’ quality of life. If users perceive that only 
security policy prevents them from taking advantage of such technology, especially if 
they are not fully apprised of the concerns for doing so, this will only lead to heightened 
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frustration and a greater perceived divide if technology workers seem to be the only 
personnel who can access systems remotely. 
2. Software Installation Barriers 
Another common concern was the Coast Guard’s policy preventing the 
installation of software unless the software configuration has been tested and approved 
for use on the Standard Workstation JII. Unfortunately, gaining approval for any such 
software is a long and tedious process and for many applications, Coast Guard users do 
not perceive any security threat and become easily frustrated. 
The clearest example of user frustration in this respect stems fiom the Coast 
Guard’s own web cast of a public meeting in December 2000. Field units were 
encouraged to participate in this event but Real Player, the required software to view the 
web cast, was not an approved software package. After extensive complaints, the unit 
involved was granted permission to temporarily install the Real Player software as long 
as it was uninstalled upon completion of the web cast. Frustration levels at the unit were 
high enough to warrant the unit writing a letter to Coast Guard Headquarters regarding 
the situation. 
Since the Coast Guard’s migration to a Windows platform, user familiarity with 
that environment has led to a thirst to take advantage of the increased capabilities these 
systems have. A successful security program cannot allow itself to be perceived as a 
hindrance to technological advancement. In the minds of users, doing so constitutes a 
self-imposed denial of service and it damages users’ trust and willingness to participate in 
effective security measures. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Information Security awareness is a problem in the Coast Guard just as it is in the 
commercial sector. No security program can succeed without the willing and 
knowledgeable participation of the personnel involved. In the Coast Guard, this is all the 
more critical since its multi-mission environment combines the security concerns of 
military intelligence, law enforcement, and regulatory body under one consolidated 
organization. 
Comparing Coast Guard user perceptions and practices with known potential 
problem areas, allows for an assessment of user awareness with regard to these areas of 
concern. In doing so, this study found that Coast Guard personnel appear susceptible to a 
number of threats which target the hum& element in information security including: 
weaknesses in password practices; limited compliance with policy; poor knowledge of 
virus characteristics and behavior; and misapplications of trust. In addition, the study 
found that user perceived information security measures as preventing the 
implementation of some key technologies that would benefit them both personally and 
operationally. 
In order to balance the ability of the Coast Guard to take advantage of emerging 
technology while simultaneously ensuring the continued security of system resources, 
user awareness must be increased. While there are a number of potential solutions that 
could assist in developing that awareness, there are strengths, weaknesses, and costs 
associated with each option. Several proposed solutions, including advanced training for 
some users, online testing, and Internet messaging applications appear to provide good 
87 
value in terms of their cost, willingness of users to participate in the programs, and the 
perceived effectiveness of those programs. 
Developing programs in which users willingly participate will be critical to the 
long-tenn effectiveness of any attempts to increase awareness. Current development 
efforts, such as the Sim Security information assurance awareness and training game 
being developed at the Naval Postgraduate School, offer promise in this area. Of equal 
import will be the elimination of the perception that security serves as a hindrance to 
conducting routine business practices effectively. Accomplishing both of these goals will 
greatly assist in enhancing user trust and will make the maintenance the Coast Guard’s 
information security efforts a cooperative effort rather than a confkontation between IT 
personnel and “regular” users. 
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APPENDIX. HUMAN FACTORS SURVEY 
The following pages form the survey administered to participants at each of the 
four selected Coast Guard units. Participants received hll-color copies of the survey in 
an attempt to most accurately simulate screen characteristics, as they would present 
themselves. 
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Form ID Number: 
Name: 
Information System Security Awareness Assessment 
The purpose of this survey is to help the Coast Guard assess the organizations current 
awareness of computer arid information system security. This assessment, while 
sponsored by TISCOM is being conducted independently with the hope oC . . Allowing users to obtain the most benefit fiom USCG Systems; Ensuring that security measures on USCG systems are actually useable by the 
average user and that they are appropriate to the system on which employed; 
Identifying the security awareness level within the USCGs user population; 
Assisting the USCG in focussing training and education efforts; and 
Assessing any perceived or real hindrances caused by the security measures 
currently in place. 
. . 
We want to ensure that the answers, comments, and concerns that you provide are as 
honest as possible. For this reason, the results of this survev will be ker>t anonymous and 
answers will be consolidated in the form of statistical data. Your name is needed on this 
sheet for the purpose of obtaining possible follow-on information only (i.e. follow-on 
interviews or clarification of comments). 
This is a survey-based assessment, not a test. No honestly provided answer is incorrect. 
When answering the questions, some questions may seem to have a similar focus. Some 
may cause a desire to change previous answers. Each question should be answered 
individually and, once answered, please try to avoid any tendency to go back to “re- 
answer” a question. 
Comments are encouraged. While the majority of the questions are of a multiple-choice 
format to aid in statistical counts, this can limit the ability to identify all situations. 
Comments which identify the question can aid in improving the survey and in addressing 
your concerns (Example: Question 3: “Specialty” - I am a Marine Inspector but have 
the collateral duty of System Administrator.). Please select the best possible answer and 
provide your comments in the space provided at the end of the survey. 
I have read the above information, understand the purpose of this survey, and am willing 
to participate. I understand that I may be contacted by the interviewer in the fbture for 
clarification or additional information. 
I am interested in participating in fbrther aspects of this study. 
Signature 
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Form ID: Unit : 
Grade: 
Specialty: 
0 Vessel Ops 0 Marine Safety 
o Afloat o Inspections 
o Ashore 0 REC 
0 Aviation o MEP 
o Investigations 
o Crewmembers 
o Support Personnel 0 Other 
0 Administrative 
(Including Supply, 
Personnel, Clerical, & 
similar positions) 
0 Info Tech Related 
General Usage Questions 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
No Little Average Skill Power User Professional 
Experience Level Level Level 
0 0 0 0 0  0 0 1. I consider my general 
computer skills to be: 
2. My knowledge of computer 0 0 0 0 0  
3. To perform my job adequately, o ' 0 0 0 0  
4. Most of the other people in my o 0 0 0 0  
security issues is: 
I feel my skill level should be: 






5. When'I have a general computer 
(formatting, sending e-mail, etc.. .) use 
o Work to find the o Seek assistance 
answer myself. from system 
question, I typically: administrator. 
o Seekthe 
guidance of a o Ignoreit or 
coworker within seek a 
my workgroup. "workaround." 
6. When I have a computer problem, o Work to find the 
(crashing, erratic system behavior, etc.. .) I answer myself o Seek assistance 
typically: fiom system 
...................................................................................................................................... 
administrator. o Seekthe 
guidance of a 
coworker within o Ignore it or 
my workgroup. seek a 
"workaround." 
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7. I know where there are copies of user 0 0 
manuals for the computer software I 
typically use. 
8. I know the policy regarding who is 0 0 
authorized to use USCG computer resources 
and for what purposes they may use them. 
9. I know the USCG policies regarding 
passwords (selection, changing, 
compromise, etc..). 
10. I know the USCG policies regarding e- 
mail use (appropriate use, attachments, 
reporting suspicious, etc.. .) 
1 1. I feel that the policies in questions 8 - 
10 are followed. 
12. If I have questions regarding USCG 
policies in these areas, I know where to find 
copies. 
13. I know who at my unit supervises these 
issues. 
14. I feel comfortable approaching them 
with questiondissues in these areas. 
15. I sometimes receive e-mail from people 















If yes, approximately how 
many times per week __ 
16. I sometimes receive unsolicited, 
commercial e-mail (a.k.a. spam) at work. 
0 
If yes, approximately how 
many times per week - 
17. I typically open and read all e-mail I 
receive. 
18. I typically open all attachments I 
receive. 
19. I know what to do if I receive a 
suspicious e-mail. 












2 1. I receive and read jokes, cartoons, 
pictures, stories, and other similar material 
via e-mail from fiiends. 
22. I don’t worry about my e-mail 
attachments since the USCG uses virus 
protection software. 
0 0 




24. I use Internet messaging software (AOL 
Instant Messenger, Yahoo! Messenger, 
MSN Messenger, ICQ, etc.. .) at work. 
25. I trust the way that the current ADC is 
posted online. 
26. I always log off or lock my workstation 
when I leave my workspace. 
27. I have a home computer or have access 
to one outside of work. 
28. I exchange material via disk, e-mail, or 
other means between work & another 
location (i.e. bring work documents home or 






29. I use the following types of computer software: 
(check all that apply including use at home, work, or other location) 
o MS Word (or other o Windows 95/98/Me o .Web Development 
word processor) (FrontPage, etc.. .) 
o MS Excel (or other o USCG Applications 
mreadsheet) 0 Linllx/uNIX (MSIS, LEIS, 
o Windows NT 
o MS Access (or other 
desktop database) 
o MacintoshOS 
o Internet Explorer or o Telnet 
o E-mail (OUtlook, o FTP 
Netscape Navigator 
Eudora, Outlook 




o Other: Please list 
30. At home, I check for operating system updates: 
0 Relatively Frequently (at least monthly) 0 Seldom (less than once per month) 
0 Only when I hear about a bug on the news 0 Never 0 Other (describe below) 
0 I don’t need to since I always use the newest software like Windows Me 
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Passwords and System Access 
31. At work, I have 
32. At home, I have 
include web sites at which you may have registered) 
different passwords (including account PIN’S). (Please enter a number) 
different passwords (including account PIN’S). (Please enter a number to 
Ouestion Yes Nn 
0 33. I work with at least one system that 0 
automatically generates random passwords: 
34. I sometimes have difficulty 
remembering passwords for different 
accounts. 
35. Currently or in the past, I’ve written 
passwords down. 
36. My unit currently, or in the past, has 
required, encouraged, or “looked the other 
w a y  with regard to password sharing to 
assist in productivity. 
37. Currently or in the past, I’ve shared one 
of my passwords. 
38. I’ve been given a coworker’s password 
before so that I could access files, 
applications, etc.. . 
39. For USCG systems, I typically select 
passwords which are the same or very 
similar to each other. 
40. When I register at a web site, I typically 
select passwords which are the same or very 
similar to those I use for USCG systems. 
41. I have written down and carried a 
banWcredit card PIN in my wallet or on my 
per son. 
42. I have been locked out of a system or 
















43. With regard to any passwords that you have created in the last year (check all that apply): 
0 They contain sequences of 4 or more letters 0 Contain English or foreign words 
0 Contain words spelled backwards 0 Contain names (people or locations) or initials 
0 Contain acronyms (USCG, SAR, NFU, etc.. .) 0 Are a variation of your user name 
0 Contain anythmg publicly available about you or your family such as license plate number, address, 
0 Contain “keyboard strings’’ (i.e. qwerty, asdf, 4567, etc.. .) 
0 Uses a common bible citation (e.g. John3 16) or other literary reference (e.g. 4score&7) 
0 Created by interrelating previous passwords or passwords fkom other systems (i.e. Xmen 10 for one 
phone number, SSN, birth dates, anniversaries, etc.. .) 
password and Xmen 1 1 and Xmenl2 as others) 
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44. If I suspect that my password has been compromised on Windows NT or if I want to change it for any 
other reason. I would: 
0 Have to wait until end of password valid period until password expires & change required at logon. 
0 Have to inform the system administrator since only they can change a password before expiration. 
0 Go on as normal since I wouldn’t want to admit password loss or don’t feel any harm done. 
0 Change password myself if so. please briefly describe below how you believe this is done. 
0 Other please describe below. 
45. You approach your machine and are presented with the following screen: 
At this pomt. you should. 
0 Enter your user name and password. Click the “OK’ button or press return to sign on. 
0 A hard reboot is always recommended at this point to clear the computer‘s memory smce you were not 
the last user of the system 
0 Press Ctrl-Alt-Del. 
0 Enter your user name and password. Change the computer’s domam to the correct one for your 
unit by selecting tiom the drop down list. Click button or press return to sign on. 
0 Other. Please descnbe below. 
95 
Viruses, Trojans, Spoofs, and other Malicious Code and Similar Threats 
46. Circle the files below which you might suspect as being potential virus/malicious code carriers (i.e. 








F Typical users don’t need to worry about computer viruses since the USCG firewall & 
virus software are up to date & prevent them fiom affecting the systems. 
If a system becomes infected with a virus, it is always obvious because either the 
system will stop working, bizarre effects will occur onscreen, or the a warning will be 
displayed by the Coast Guard’s actively scanning virus software. 
A weakness of malicious software including all keyboard loggers, password sniffing 
programs, and other similar programs is that they must be active in the system’s 
memory and can be identified and shut down from the Windows NT task manager. 
Users that limit their computer use to Microsoft Word, Excel, and Outlook are 
unlikely to become infected with a virus since viruses are most fiequently contained 
in executable program files or are downloaded from the Internet. 
Viruses spread so rapidly that it is critical to get the word ,out quickly. To help 
prevent this, Coast Guard policy states that if you are the first to receive a virus 
warning via e-mail, you should forward it to all members of your command as well as 
to FlagPlot@comdt.uscg.mil so that preventive measures can be taken. 
If I receive an e-mail at work, I know that it and any attachments really came fiom the 
sender since the firewall filters out all “spoofed” e-mail. 
If I suspect that my system has a virus, the best practice is always to shut down the 







54. Do you have virus protection software installed on your home computer and other non-work computer 
systems? (Circle One) Yes No 
If yes, how often do you update the virus definitions? 
0 Weekly or less 0 At least once each month 0 Occasionally 
0 WhenIhearaboutanewvirus 0 Never 0 Set to Automatically update 
If your software is set to automatically update, do you (check all that apply): 
0 Leave the system on at all times 0 Use a dial-up Internet connection 
0 Have your ISP password stored on your system 
0 Occasionally manually check the system’s virus definition date 
55. Do multiple people (hmily members, etc.. .) have access to your home/other systems? Yes No 
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.. . .. .. . .. . . . 
56. Do multiple people install software, access the internet, or download files on your home/other system? 
0 No, only I perform these activities. 
0 I’m not certain what other users do. 0 Yes, this is normal. 
57. In general, the other users of the non-work systems I use are: 
0 Less familiar with computers 0 Equally Familiar 0 More Familiar 
58. With regard to hardware connections to my computer systems (Check all that apply): 
0 Sometimes, but only with my knowledge. 
0 I am familiar with, and fiequently check these connections on my work computer. 
0 I am familiar with and fiequently check these connections on my non-work computers. 
0 I am familiar with but don’t check these connections often. 
0 The wiring to at least some of my systems is a mess or is hidden and difficult to assess. 
0 At work, new hardware connections would have to be installed by a system administrator and so 
are of little or no threat. 
0 I have seen or heard of hardware-based keystroke logging items such as Key Ghost. 
Internet Security, Digital Signatures, and Encryption 
Figure A and Figure B below are 2 examples of the many Internet web sites which request that you 
submit personal andor financial information over the Internet. 
Figure A Figure B 
59. Do you feel that it would be safe to submit information over the Internet using the site displ 
Figure A? (Circle One) Yes No 
yed in 
60. Would you feel comfortable submitting information using the site displayed in Figure A? 
6 1. Do you feel that it would be safe to submit information over the Internet using the site displayed in 
Figure B? (Circle One) Yes No 
62. Would you fee1 comfortable submitting information using the site displayed in Figure B?Yes 




64. In the lower nght hand comer of Figure A IS a small padlock . What does this let you know 
about the web site? 
65. With regard to Figure A, if you wanted to obtain more information about the method of providing 
security for this site. how would you go about doing that? 
66 When usmg the Internet, many times you may be presented w t h  vanous message and dialog boxes 
concernmg the secunty of the sites you usit Below are some of the items which you might see To the 
nght of each, please descnbe how you would handle each. whether you would be concerned. if you would 
ipore  them. etc (Not being sure what to do is a completely appropnate answer) 
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Question Yes NO 
67. Do you ever receive e-mail in which the 
sender inadvertently forgets to include the 
attachment? 
68. Have you ever inadvertently forgotten 
to include an e-mail attachment? 
0 
0 
69. Considering the last 2 questions, if you 0 
were occasionally required to digitally si-gn 
or encrypt e-mail. & doing so required you 
to remember to click an additional button 
before sending, do you think you might 
inadvertently forget to do so before sending? 
70. Not all e-mail systems recognize all 
digital signatures & encryption formats 
making your e-mail unreadable by some 
recipients. Knowing this, do you feel that a 
default setting that signs and encrypts all e- 
mail would be a viable solution? 
7 1. Often, digital signatureiencryption keys 
are stored on a user’s computer. If you 
installed a key on your personal computer. 
do you feel comfortable that you would 
understand how to secure it to prevent 
accidental or intentional use by others? 
0 
0 
72. Would you feel comfortableisafe using 0 
smart cards for signingiencryption? 
7 3 .  Would you feel comfortable using 










Measures to Improve Security Awareness 
74. As you may have determined fiom this survey, there are many factors to consider with regard to 
Computer Security issues, and user awareness plays a key role in many of these areas. There are a number 
of ways to attempt to increase the general awareness level of the USCG’s user base. Below is a list of 
potential formats to use in increasing awareness levels. Each item is followed by two spaces. In the fist 
space, please rank order the list of education alternatives in the order, 1 through 10, that you personally 
would prefer to experience them (i.e. If you would most prefer mandatory formal training, mark this as 1. 
If your second choice would be to receive e-mail notices regarding security issues, mark this 2, etc.. . until 
the list is exhausted). In the second space, please rank what you feel the likely effectiveness of this type of 
education from 1 (completely ineffective) to 7 (extremely effective). A ranking of “4” should be 
considered to be of average effectiveness. 
Category Rank Effectiveness Category Rank Effectiveness 
Required Periodic Formal 
Training on Computer 
Security. 
Requiring personnel to 
periodically review and 
take a short online test 
covering USCG computer 
security policy. 
Publishing periodic, 
humorous summations of - 
security “lessons learned” 
similar to current medical 
mishaps messages. 
Providing advanced 
training to approximately 
5 - 10% of average office 
users so they could better 
answertassist coworkers. 
Providing ESO’s with 
copies of educational 
computer security videos. 
Maintaining a Frequently 
Asked Questions web site - 
for security issues. 
Publishing posters of 
which highlight computer 
security issues (possibly 
humorous/McGruff “take 
a bite out of crime” style). 
Having a computer 
“answer man” available - 
via live chat, AOL instant 
messenger, or other means 
to answer user concerns in 
real time. 
System administrators 
using password cracking 
programs to identify users 
with weak passwords 
Live demonstrations of 
hacking techniques and 
how to prevent them. 
Question Yes No 
75. In general, are you comfortable with 
your knowledge of computer security? 
76. Do you feel USCG security policy is 
too strict or extensive? 
77. Do you feel USCG security policy is 
too weak? 
78. Do you feel that you could perform 
more safely/effectively if you better 
understood computer security issues? 
79. Do you feel that the USCG is taking the 







80. What measures would you like to see implemented to improve security awareness? 
8 1. Do you know of any current technology that it appears the USCG is not fully taking advantage of, 
possibly due to security concerns? (Examples: Are remotehome network access policies too restrictive? 
Is there software that could improve job performance that you are not allowed to install on your work 
system?) 
82. Do you trust the security of the USCG’s computer systems? Why or Why not? 
Comments 
Please use the following space to provide any additional comments you would like to express or to more 
fully explain an answer to a previous question to which you would like to provide comments. You may 
continue on the back if you need additional space. 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS SURVEY 
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